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Constitutional Jurisprudence of History and
Natural Law: Complementary or Rival Modes of
Discourse?
C.M.A. MCCAULIFF*
The Bill of Rights provides broadly conceived guarantees which
invite specific judicial interpretation to clarify the purpose, scope
and meaning of particular constitutional safeguards. Two time-
honored but apparently divergent approaches to the jurisprudence
of constitutional interpretation have been employed in recent first
amendment cases: first, history has received prominent attention
from former Chief Justice Burger in open-trial, family and reli-
gion cases; second, natural law has been invoked by Justice Bren-
nan in the course of responding to the Chief Justice's historical
interpretation. History, although indirectly stating constitutional
values, provides the closest expression of the Chief Justice's own
jurisprudence and political philosophy. Justice Brennan is less pa-
tient with indirect, experiential extraction of jurisprudential values
from history. He presents his own public distillation of consitu-
tional values, and directly applies them as absolute principles in
the context of case-by-case claims of constitutional guarantees.
Nevertheless, both of these approaches permit some agreement on
fundamental values as well as provide the means of articulating
clear differences in constitutional interpretation. The general char-
acteristics of each approach to opinion writing and the different
uses of each approach are confirmed by extending the study to
two earlier Justices who used these methods to articulate their ap-
proaches and differences, Justices Horace Gray (1882-1901) and
Stephen J. Field (1863-97). Justice Gray, the historian, was more
"liberal," and Justice Field, the natural lawyer, was more "con-
servative" in his approach to constitutional problems involving the
role of government regulation of business and the effect of private
enterprise on nineteenth century consumers. The purpose of this
article is to set forth the discourse of history and natural law in
which some current first amendment issues find their solutions,
and to use the reflections from the Gray-Field dialogue to deline-
ate more closely the central features common to each approach.
* Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law, A.B., Bryn Mawr Col-
lege, Ph.D. University of Toronto, J.D. University of Chicago. The author wishes to thank
Larry Fleischer for his generous collegiality in discussing historical subjects.
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I. HISTORY AS AN EXPRESSION AND REPOSITORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
History combines data, experience and sophisticated analysis of
documents with gaps in knowledge and generalities about every-
thing which undergoes change over a period of time. It prides it-
self on its objectivity in explicitly describing cause and effect; or
rather, the causes and effects of everything from compulsory
church attendance during the reign of the first English Queen
Elizabeth and compulsory American military (or alternative) ser-
vice during the war in Vietnam to Brunellescho's mathematical
concept of renaissance architectural harmonies and General Doo-
little's pioneering achievements in aerospace science. Nevertheless,
subjectivity in the form of moral evaluation can not be eliminated
from history, which views human beings as actors "with purposes
and motives."' Historians' use of ethical, causal and purposive
concepts comports with the "normal modicum of objectivity, im-
partiality and accuracy" found in judgments within contemporary
society.2 History depends on the questions we ask, and values
therefore play a large part in forming our historical judgments. To
sample the opinions of only two distinguished historians, both Sir
Isiah Berlin, who thinks that the judgments we bring to history
are the traditions of our own values,3 and Jacob Burckhardt, who
thought that history itself shapes our moral judgments,4 found
that morality and history have a point of conjunction. In this way,
history is deemed to have value, and not merely functional utility.
Constitutional history similarly deals with the public values of
the Founding Fathers and succeeding generations of amenders
and interpreters. Since the United States Constitution and the Bill
of Rights were written at particular points in time to endure from
generation to generation, frequent reference to history is often
necessary in judicial opinions. The relevance of history is even
more pointed in first amendment cases, in which the Supreme
Court has had to search for the purpose of various clauses., Thus,
Chief Justice Burger's examination of history is not unusual in
1. I, BERLIN, HISTORICAL INEVITABILITY 53 (1954).
2. Id. at 52.
3. Id. at 53. Berlin condemns the view that historians should refrain from moral
judgment as "one of the greatest and most destructive fallacies of the last hundred years."
Id.
4. J. BURCKHARDT, FORCE AND FREEDOM: REFLECTION ON HISTORY 360 (J. Nichols,
ed. 1943).
5. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947), dealing with the purpose of
the establishment clause in the first amendment. Former Chief Justice Burger nowhere
directly espoused the use of history as a source of expression for his values, but the promi-
nent attention it receives in several of his opinions permits consideration of history as an
organizing principle of his views.
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itself. The very prominent position that the Chief Justice has
given to history as a repository of constitutional values, however,
both suggests its importance to his view of the Constitution, and
provides the means for a coherent examination of constitutional
jurisprudence.' He acknowledged that moral concepts provide the
basis for law by imbuing otherwise sterile commands with "real
meaning in terms of human value."'7 The Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights gave
"promises of freedom, of ideals declared, and of hopes for the fu-
ture" to be shown forth in the work of each succeeding generation
first to "create a cohesive society or government"8 and then to
maintain these freedoms in the face of successive challenges.
American national and constitutional history embodies "the
sources of our law and way of life."' Thus Chief Justice Burger
found in constitutional history the expression of national public
values.
History is an especially appropriate vehicle for constitutional in-
terpretation since it exists on the same level of specificity as the
case-by-case facts which are presented to the Court. History is
thus unlike natural law, which exists on a greater level of general-
ity than the narrative, factual components of history and judicial
cases. Natural law is unashamedly not factual and specific; it di-
rectly announces that it embodies a selection of particular values.
Indeed, natural law has been described as political ideology.10 Un-
like natural law, constitutional history requires extensive analysis
to determine the values embedded in history.
II. NATURAL LAW AS A MODERN EXPRESSION OF
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
Natural law does not purport to rely on experience or empirical
solutions but boldly asserts "that law is a part of ethics."1 1 A. P.
d'Entreves, the great modern scholar who has explicated the two-
thousand year old concept of natural law, provides the following
clarifications. Natural law is "a name for the point of intersection
6. Wyzanski, History and Law, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 237, 242 (1959) directly es-
pouses the value of history for judicial interpretation of law. H. BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG
INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY 64-132 (1951), describes the use of history as a moral
interpreter.
7. Burger, The Role of the Lawyer Today, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (1983).
8. Burger, Remarks at the Dedication of the Norton Clapp Law Center, 4 U. PU-
GET SOUND L. REV. 1, 2 (1980).
9. Burger, supra note 7, at 5.
10. A. PASSERIN D'ENTRtVES, NATURAL LAW: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 113 (1965).
11. Id. at 114.
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between law and morals; 12 its essential function is to mediate
"between the moral sphere and the sphere of law proper.""3 In
this way, natural law itself has no content but provides a method-
ology for asserting, for example, constitutional values.
Justice Brennan in an article remarked upon the aridity and
moral bankruptcy of non-natural law approaches to jurisprudence,
which flourished earlier in this century. 4 In the same article, Jus-
tice Brennan suggested that "law has again come alive as a living
process responsible to changing human need."' 5 He directly at-
tributes this reflorescence of the law to a resurgence of interest 1
6
in natural law:
Perhaps some of you may detect, as I think I do, a return to the
philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas in the new jurisprudence.
Call it a resurgence, if you will, of concepts of natural law-but
no matter. St. Thomas, you will remember, was in complete
agreement with the Greek tradition, both in its Aristotelian and
Platonic modes, that law must be concerned with seeing things
whole, that it is but part of the whole human situation and
draws its validity from its position in the entire scheme of
things. It is folly to think that law, any more than religion and
education, should serve only its own symmetry rather than ends
defined by other disciplines.' (citation omitted)
This shift of emphasis from "legal precedent"' to "justice"' 9 has
"profound importance" 20 for judicial decision-making in Bill of
Rights cases. Adherence to natural law frees Justice Brennan
from the constraints of history. "For the Founding Fathers knew
better than to pin down their descendants too closely. Enduring
principles rather than petty details were what they sought to write
down.' In this way, the Constitution is a "timeless ' 22 and "sub-
12. Id. at 116.
13. Id.
14. Brennan, How Goes the Supreme Court, 36 MERCER L. REv. 781, 785 (1985).
For a recent study, see Defeis, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 16 SETON HALL L. REV.
429 (1986).
15. Id. at 787.
16. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971), R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
OUsLY (1978) and LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) and J. FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS (1981) represent recent contribution to a rights-based theory of natural law.
17. Brennan, supra note 14, at 787-88. R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HIs-
TORY 3 (1923), suggested that authority, philosophy (natural law) and history provide tools
to align past and present. See also C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF
HISTORY 35-36 (1969) for an application of Pound's principles of the Supreme Court in
which authority is interpretation as a written constitution. Justice Brennan's view is based
on natural law; Chief Justice Burger's on history.:
18. Brennan, supra note 14, at 786.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 789-90. Cf. the same thought in Abington v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203, 24
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
[Vol. 24
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lime oration on the dignity of man, a bold commitment by a peo-
ple to the ideal of libertarian dignity protected through law."23
The achievement of timelessness is through the absolute expres-
sion of constitutional values. Natural law, a set of broad, high-
minded but vague principles, is thus used to interpret the Consti-
tution which itself is equally broad and high-minded and just as
vague. To avoid multiplying the vagueness, the principles of natu-
ral law, such as a devotion to justice, acquire their own meaning
for each generation but are conceived of absolute principles by
their adherents at the time they are applied. Thus the ultimate
constitutional issue for Justice Brennan is, "What do the words of
the text mean in our time?"24 As d'Entreves concluded, natural
law is "an endeavour to formulate in legal or 'normative' terms
certain fundamental values which were believed to be absolutely
valid."25
III. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS: GOVERNMENTAL
REGULATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
During the nineteenth century, both history and natural law
provided judges with opportunities for presenting the reasoning in
their decision-making. The opinions of two Supreme Court Jus-
tices, Gray (1882-1902) and Field (1863-1867), illustrate the fac-
tors for selecting history or natural law in the context of deciding
cases on the validity of legislative regulation of business and gov-
ernmental powers generally. Gray was best known for his adher-
ence to precedent and his historical, if not antiquarian, interest.
His reputation for scholarly use of legal history was and is un-
questioned. The standard format for Gray's opinions with their
precedential and chronological presentation appealed to him, pre-
sumably because that format most readily justified the recent sta-
tus quo which enjoyed both Justice Gray's adherence and fairly
broad acceptance among the general public. Field often urged a
move away from immediate precedent by couching his opinions in
terms of natural law.
22. Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27
So. TEx. L. REv. 433, 445 (1986).
23. Id. at 437, and A. Passerin D'Entr6ves, supra note 10, at 117.
24. Brennan, supra note 22, at 438; "the genius of the Constitution rests not in any
static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability
of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs. What the constitu-
tional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be the measure to the
vision of our time. Similarly what those fundamentals mean for us, our descendants will
learn cannot be the measure to the vision of their time." The same thought appears in
Brennan, supra note 14, at 793.
25. A. PASSERIN D'ENTRtVES, supra note 10, at 117.
1988]
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During the 1890s, the Court did change from broad approba-
tion of legislative regulation of business to greater scrutiny of the
reasonableness of that governmental regulation. When the Court
first turned its attention to the role of the state government in the
expanding industrialization of the country after the Civil War, it
willingly supported legislative endeavors. The 1877 decision in
Munn v. Illinois,2 showed the way. In the 1870s, widespread hos-
tility to railroads' extortionate rates led to revolt against the rail-
roads' control of several state legislatures and gave rise to the
temporary reforms partially reflected in Munn itself. Illinois farm-
ers, who saw that grain storage houses (elevators) in Chicago
would agree to store farmers' grain only if it had been carried
from the farm by particular railroads, sought help from the state
legislature to set rates for storage in the grain elevators in Chi-
cago. " As historians have shown, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the legislative rate regulation by adapting old common law to the
new situation and thus declaring the legislation constitutional, de-
spite political editorializing to the effect that rate regulation was
communistic. 28 Although Justice Field dissented, Munn is the sort
of decision that fitted in with the view Gray already shared, and
later continued to hold on the Court. It even invoked Matthew
Hale's 17th-century treatise De Portibus Marls for the concept
that private rights yield to public interest when a business ac-
quires an effective monopoly in the area it serves. 29 The farmers
were still considered the backbone of America in 1876, and Munn
might be idealistically seen as upholding the public interest. In
political terms, Munn may be broadly characterized as humanistic
rather than economically materialistic.3 " If Munn is read in this
way, laissez-faire materialism had to take a back seat to public
26. 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
27. Munn is perhaps the most famous case resulting from the Granger Movement in
which farmers and small businessmen temporarily influenced the state legislatures which
normally favored big business. R. GABRIEL, THE COURSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC
THOUGHT 282 (1956); J. LURIE, LAW AND THE NATION, 1865-1912, 21-22 (1983).
28. R. MCCLOsKEY, Stephen Field in, 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SU-
PREME COURT, 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1069, 1085 (1969) [herein-
after 2 THE JUSTICES]. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of
Public Purpose in the State Courts, LAW IN AM. HIsT. 329, 358 (1971); R. MCCLOSKEY,
AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRISE 1865-1910: A STUDY OF WILLIAM
GRAHAM SUMNER, STEPHEN J. FIELD AND ANDREW CARNEGIE 79-87 (1951).
29. Fairman, The So-called Granger Cases, Lord Hale, and Justice Bradley, 5
STAN. L. REv. 587 (1953).
30. McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government Business Rela-
tions: Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 62 J. OF AM. HIST.
970 (1975) cautions against connecting the economic materialism of the then-current lais-
sez-faire philosophy too closely with the judiciary. R. MCCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVA-
TISM, supra note 28, at 169, described earlier conservatism as possessing "[mluch that was
warm and humanistic," as the "older tory tradition" did.
[Vol. 24
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interest so that legislative power is deemed to protect that public
interest. The emphasis on legislation at least at the time the Munn
compromise was forged also meant that the court viewed itself as
not interfering with the legislature."a Thus, the non-interventionist
court provided a limited scope to judicial review.
A. Continuity of the Status Quo in Justice Gray's Historical
Opinions
All of the concepts in Munn suited Justice Horace Gray well,
and set the scene for the sort of expectations Gray had when he
assumed his position on the Supreme Court. Thus, precedent
suited him in constructing opinions. In most cases, Justice Gray
did not reach beyond precedent to use the historical essay "as an
instrument of extreme political activism, involving extensive judi-
cial intervention in contemporary political problems. 32 Gray used
history in the form of precedent to uphold state legislative regula-
tion of industry. State legislation for health and safety came under
the rubric of police power which Munn defined broadly. Gray de-
scribed the police power as "that inherent and necessary power,
essential to the very existence of civil society, and the safeguard of
the inhabitants of the State against disorder, disease, poverty and
crime."3 3 Everything from liquor, professional licensing, health
measures and products to worker compensation fell under the po-
lice power. With regard to liquor, prohibitionists campaigned in
several states and brought their special interest to the attention of
state legislatures. 4 Several legislatures responded by prohibiting
the manufacture and sale of liquor on the grounds that even
though consumption initially injures the drinker, liquor ultimately
harmed the drinker's family and "demoralized society." In such
states, those interested in selling liquor simply imported liquor
from neighboring states. The state simply responded by trying the
prevent the importation.
In Leisy v. Hardin,3 5 the Supreme Court thought that the inter-
state commerce clause protected the imported liquor so long as it
remained in its original out-of-state package. Gray in dissent was
not swayed by the interstate commerce issues but adhered to the
31. R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 28, at 60.
32. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 S. CT. REV. 119. Contrast
Gray's interpretation of the Dred Scott decision, as noted in Spector, Legal Historian on
the United States Supreme Court: Justice Horace Gray, Jr., and the Historical Method 12
Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 181, 188-92 (1968).
33. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 127 (1890) (Gray, J., dissenting).
34. J. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS TO A
CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, 28 (1978).
35. Leisy, 135 U.S. 100.
19881
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force of precedent which supported the police power of the state.
Using his usual precedential format, Gray cited Justice Story and
the Slaughterhouse Cases and concluded that the police power
was "essential to maintenance of the authority of local govern-
ment."3  The Leisy dissent was one of his more famous opinions.
Its length of thirty-four pages in the United States Reports makes
it a compelling example of what one commentator described as
Gray's technique of convincing not by incisive cuts of the sur-
geon's knife but by massive pressures brought upon a single
point."' a
Indeed, in reviewing all the precedents, Justice Gray recognized
that judicial power achieves its end "through the decisions of
courts mounting precedent on precedent."38 Gray emphasized that
Congress did not give absolute protection to interstate commerce,
especially because Congress had been silent in this particular area
of interstate commerce. Furthermore, the state's prohibition laws
were rendered ineffective by importation of out-of-state liquor,
and Gray did not wish to see state legislative powers weakened
because the "protection of the safety, the health, the morals, the
good order and the general welfare of the people is the chief end
of government. Salus populi suprema lex."39
During his rehearsal of precedents from Justice Marshall's day
to the most recent cases, Gray isolated the License Cases of 1847
as controlling in Leisy because Chief Justice Taney recognized
that a state law regulating interstate commerce was "valid so long
as it was not in conflict with any Act of Congress. '40 There the
liquor included varieties from out-of-state sold in their own pack-
ages. 41 Gray was not content to rest with that observation, how-
ever, and detailed each separate opinion in each of the License
Cases in order to show that the majority in Leisy departed not
only from the essence of the License Cases on which all the Jus-
tices who rendered an opinion had agreed after thorough and
careful consideration, but also from forty years of precedent fol-
lowing the License Cases. Gray's conclusion in his Leisy dissent is
one of his most powerful pieces of writing, and sets forth his rea-
sons for following the decision in the License Cases.
36. Id. at 128.
37. Spector, supra note 32, at 205.
38. Brown, Police Power-Legislation for Health and Personal Safety, 42 HARV.
L.REv. 866, 871 (1929).
39. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 158. Therefore Justice Gray did not think that the commerce
clause without enabling legislation was sufficient to impair "the police power in each State
within its own borders to protect the health and welfare of its inhabitants." Id. at 132.
40. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 158.
41. Id. at 137.
[Vol. 24
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[B]ecause it was made upon full argument and great considera-
tion; because it established a wise and just rule, regarding a
most delicate point in our complex system of government, a
point always difficult of definition and adjustment, the contact
between the paramount commercial power granted to Congress
and the inherent police power reserved to the States; because it
is in accordance with the usage and practice which have pre-
vailed during the century since the adoption of the Constitution;
because it has been accepted and acted on for forty years by
Congress, by the state legislatures, by the courts and by the peo-
ple, and because to hold otherwise would add nothing to the dig-
nity and supremacy of the powers of Congress, while it would
cripple, not to say destroy, the whole control of every State over
the sale of intoxicating liquors within its borders.42
Because of Leisy v. Hardin, of the states lobbied with Congress
which passed the Wilson Act that same year, giving states power
over liquor within their borders as soon as it arrived. 43 Gray in
effect had said in Leisy that the states already possessed the
power Congress gave them in the Wilson Act. Again history was
at the service of a liberal status quo, not to say a paternalistic
view of state regulation which Munn v. Illinois had also set
forth." According to Gray, the state legislatures, as the chosen
representatives of the people, were responding to popular majori-
ties. Gray had no fear of the people in these instances. 5
Especially in the wake of the Wilson Act, the Court stopped
short of invoking the interstate commerce clause to prevent mar-
garine from being imported into a state. In Plumbley v. Massa-
chusetts,4" the Court treated the state's legislative prohibition
against margarine as a health provision within its police power.
New manufacturing techniques such as the use of boric acid pre-
servatives and the substitution of vegetable fats for butter permit-
ted the introduction of oleomargarine as a less expensive substi-
tute for dairy butter.47 Again, public health and welfare were the
stated concerns. It is likely, at least once the manufacture of mar-
garine was perfected, that continued prohibition against marga-
rine was enforced to eliminate competition for dairy farmers.48
Use of the interstate commerce clause to prevent anti-competitive
42. Id. at 160.
43. J. SEMONCHE, supra note 34, at 280.
44. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 160. R. GABRIEL, supra note 27, at 292. The Court's invoca-
tion of the police power is usually liberal.
45. Later, Budd v. N.Y. 143 U.S. 157, 551 (1892) upheld Munn, and Brewer, J.
dissenting, simply stated, "the paternal theory of government is odious to me." Brewer felt
that "[t]he utmost possible liberty to the individual and the fullest protection to his prop-
erty is both the limitation and duty of government." Id.
46. 155 U.S. 461 (1894).
47. Brown, supra note 38, at 877.
48. Id. at 879.
1988]
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legislative provisions would not necessarily require overturning
precedent and breaking continuity but could be done on a case by
case determination of the reasonableness of the state legislation.
This would have entailed a movement toward judicial activism
and away from deference to the state legislature, and limited judi-
cial review which accompanied Gray's precedential deference to
state legislative power. Indeed, that deference, as much as any-
thing, signified the liberalism in Gray's position since the legisla-
tive regulation provision at that time tended to be liberal and os-
tensibly protective of public welfare (though perhaps in some
instance protecting special economic interests). As one commenta-
tor put it, these were social rather than individual values.4 9
Several of Gray's other opinions make a greater use of history
itself rather than precedent alone, although Gray's methodology
does not differ greatly in more historically oriented cases. These
cases are also concerned with governmental powers. Thus in
United States v. Lee,50 Gray, in dissent, suggested that the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity should have prevented the Lees from
being able to sue.51 Here again corporate rather than individual
values emerged as central in Justice Gray's view. George Wash-
ington Parke Custis Lee, son of Mary and Robert E. Lee, contin-
ued his mother's suit to recover land in Arlington confiscated by
the government in 1862, when the Lees sent an agent to pay the
taxes on the land, and government agents refused the payment
unless tendered by the Lees in person. The Court distinguished
between sovereign immunity defined as direct suit against the gov-
ernment itself and permissible suit against federal officers individ-
ually. In order to provide the Lees protection, the court took an
activist position, and suggested that this was a justiciable
question.
Gray immediately pointed out that sovereign immunity should
have applied because the United States held the land at the time
of the suit, and therefore courts have no authority to try the ti-
tle. 2 He emphasized that sovereign immunity is "essential to the
common defense and general welfare."' 53 Gray limited himself to
"the time since Magna Charta," which provided a due process
clause akin to that of the fifth amendment.
Gray's use of history here again was admired and would still be
considered unobjectionable." The Lee dissent was a search of his-
49. Id. at 876-77.
50. 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
51. Id. at 225 (Gray, J., dissenting).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 226.
54. The criteria set forth in Kelly, supra note 32, at 8 and Nelson, History and
[Vol. 24
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tory to show how much continuity was needed in the area of sov-
ereign immunity. Again, the necessity of sovereign immunity for
good government did not change during this time. To be sure,
Gray had his mind made up about sovereign immunity before he
looked at the facts of this case. 55 This shows Gray's "integrity,"
but does not necessarily mean that history should be more than
one factor in the decision-making process. 56 On the bench, he
made a pure use of history. Lee was a respected dissenting opinion
since Gray's integrity and rightness on the law were clear. Again,
however, he was not thinking of a particular mistake which might
have made application of the doctrine unfair in this case.
In Lee, Gray was not content with precedent, but looked to an-
cient statutes and treatises as well, commenting that even though
Bracton held the king subject to God and the law, Bracton recog-
nized sovereign immunity. This was simply a straight presentation
of history without interpretation. Gray continued through Elizabe-
than, Jacobean and Victorian precedents before turning to Ameri-
can statutes and cases. At the end of his exhaustive discussion of
all the precedents, Gray proceeded to draw his conclusion as to
what the Supreme Court's practice had been throughout its his-
tory. He reconciled all decisions and aligned the cases with the
English practice by dividing the factual situations into different
categories, saving the last category for the Lee case itself: if the
sovereign power appears and properly claims immunity stating
that its agents nominally hold the property for the sovereign as
public property, the court has no jurisdiction to entertain the
claimants' suit.
Again, in deference to the powers of other governmental enti-
ties, Gray thought that the Court should reach no decision. He
found no basis for judicial action because he felt that the histori-
cal precedents he cited controlled the outcome of this case since
the principle of sovereign immunity operated on the basis of the
sovereign's claim, and was not curtailed by any factual wrongdo-
ing the claimant alleged to have suffered at the hands of the gov-
ernment. Thus, only history itself was relevant to Gray's approach
to the Lees' case. Other factors, such as those included in the
sympathetic presentation the Lees made, never dislodged the pri-
macy of history for controlling the result Gray wished to see.
Once history showed that the sovereign will not be sued without
Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237, 1256 (1986) are met in
Gray's opinions.
55. Briggs v. Lightboats, 11 Allen 157 (Mass. 1865).
56. Sullivan, The Honest Muse: Judge Wisdom and the Uses of History, 60 TUL. L.
REv. 314 (1985).
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its permission there was in Gray's mind no suit possible for the
Lees.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark 57 involved the issue of congres-
sional power over citizenship. The case demonstrates Gray's char-
acteristic use of historical sources. Wong Kim Ark was born in
San Francisco in 1873, and upon returning to the United States
from a visit to China in 1894, was refused entry on the ground
that he was not a citizen. Gray traced the English concept of citi-
zenship, which revolved around birth in a land subject to the
Crown's protection, and contrasted that view with the European
position that a child takes its nationality from its parents. Gray
noted that the law of England was the law of the American colo-
nies and remained the law of the United States. The final hurdle
for Gray to overcome was the argument accepted in the
Slaughterhouse Cases,58 that children of foreign nationals were
excluded from American citizenship. Gray simply explained that
the drafters of the fourteenth amendment did not intend to change
existing law, and cited congressional debates on the fourteenth
amendment which included American-born children of foreign na-
tionals under the umbrella of American citizenship. 9
Gray's decision directly construed the meaning of citizenship in
the Constitution itself and in its fourteenth amendment. To do
this he had to go beyond his characteristic recital of precedent.
Gray himself had earlier ruled that Indians cannot be citizens
since they are not subject to American jurisdiction, and had to
exclude the precedent on jurisdictional grounds.6 0 Furthermore, he
had to distinguish several jurisdictional statutes on the ground
that while a statute might amend common law, it could not
change the constitution.
Gray recognized that Congress might enlarge grounds for natu-
ralized citizenship, but he said it was powerless to diminish citi-
zenship granted by the Constitution itself. According to Gray, the
fourteenth amendment granted a racial guarantee to blacks
which, if it was ignored, could also sweep away citizenship rights
for Europeans. 6 ' Thus, history controlled but only when Gray had
paired away all the tangential precedents to reveal the original
meaning of the Constitution for citizenship by birth in an Ameri-
57. 169 U.S. 649 (1894).
58. 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 36, 73 (1873). Justice Miller stated that the phrase, "subject
to its jurisdiction" in the fourteenth amendment "was intended to exclude from its opera-
tion children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the
United States ." Id.
59. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 675.
60. Elk v. Watkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 (1884).
61. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 694, 726.
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can jurisdiction. This is a great departure from simple exclusion of
all other factors beyond a straight line of precedents, even when
precedents had to be categorized factually into different groups to
make the meaning appear, as in Lee. Here, contradictory prece-
dents and legislative directives required Gray to make many dis-
tinctions in order to isolate the fourteenth amendment and the
constitutional references themselves from all other historical data.
It is difficult to conclude that policy here did not influence
Gray's categorizations of the pure precedents to be followed. This
would suggest that Gray, at least in Wong Kim Ark, was shaping
his opinion from his judgments about history. In this way, history
really is giving values to the judge who is deciding the case. Gray
was stepping beyond his usual mode of decision-making. His own
values perhaps originally shaped his study of history, and caused
him to present a broader interpretation of history than mere reci-
tal of precedent alone would show. The history and present appli-
cation of the word citizen formed the heart of Gray's opinion.
There was no quarrel with the accuracy of Justice Gray's histori-
cal research, but there was much dissatisfaction with Gray's ex-
tension of constitutional protection to children of foreign nationals
born in the United States. Gray's long-standing commitment to
that workman-like use of historical precedents both: 1) buys credi-
bility for Gray's treatment of history in Wong when he steps be-
yond precedent; and 2) obscures the real achievement and courage
it took Gray to strike out here.
Chief Justice Fuller dissented on the ground that children of
Chinese descent born in this country nevertheless owe allegence to
the Emperor of China by the Emperor's own reckoning. Fuller's
biographer recognized Gray's and Fuller's divergent purposes in
studying precedents. "Gray was a legal historian-perhaps the
greatest that the Court has ever had. His investigation of the an-
cient precedents was tireless and completely objective; once he
had reached a conclusion from his research, he applied it relent-
lessly to the problem before him."6 Fuller, on the other hand,
used precedents "to distinguish them rather than to apply them; to
unshackle the future from the past. '6 3 As one recent commentator
concluded, "Justice Gray in his stolid, unswerving, and deter-
mined way carried the Court to a momentous decision . . . and
bucked a political current that seemed to demand a contrary
decision. 64
62. W. KING, MELVILLE WESTON FULLER: CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES,
1888-1910, 238 (1967).
63. Id.
64. J. SEMONCHE, supra note 34, at 111.
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On the basis of this one case alone, one commentator concluded
that, "Gray's knowledge of the teachings of history led him to a
liberal view of citizenship and the status of aliens that has not
seen its counterpart until the most recent decisions of the Warren
Court." 5 History, however, did not always provide Gray with
such a consistently liberal position as far as the would-be citizen
was concerned. Gray's consistency rather revolved around his
upholding congressional sovereignty in all matters of citizenship.
His opinion in Wong Kim Ark, "illustrates well the creative amal-
gam that can be wrought by mixing the archaic past to the pre-
sent."167 There, "the backward look dovetailed into a reading of
the citizenship clause to protect the birthright of Chinese-Ameri-
cans," an achievement which was "perhaps his most important
legacy."68
Finally, the case in which Gray most departed from history and
suffered most from contemporary conservative criticism was Juil-
liard v. Greenman.6 9 This case again involved governmental power
and sovereignty to issue paper treasury notes as money even in
peacetime pursuant to a 1878 Act of Congress. He found analo-
gous situations in American legal history in the chartering and
establishment of a national bank despite constitutional silence, so
that the implied powers of Congress were held to be very broad
under the Necessary and Proper Clause in Justice Marshall's
opinions in McCulloch v. Maryland"° and United States Bank v.
Bank of Georgia.7 1 Similarly, Gray relied on Osborn v. United
States Bank, 2 especially Justice Johnson's concurrence, which
mentioned that "the framers of the Constitution evidently in-
tended to give to Congress alone power over the currency of the
country. '7 3 After treating implied powers in general, Gray briefly
described the constitutional authority of Congress to establish the
country's currency, citing two precedents.7 4 Finally, Gray left
American precedents behind and turned to the policies requiring
recognition of Congress's power to issue paper money.
It appears to us to follow, as a logical and necessary conse-
quence, that Congress has the power to issue the obligations to
the United States in such form, and to impress upon them such
65. Spector, supra note 32, at 207.
66. FILLER, Horace Gray, in 2 THE JUSTICES, supra note 28, 1386.
67. J. SEMONCHE, supra note 34, at 114.
68. Id. at 147.
69. 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
70. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
71. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 333, 347 (1825).
72. 22 U.S (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
73. Id. at 873.
74. Juilliard, 110 U.S. 421.
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qualities as currency for the purchase of merchandise and the
payment of debts, as accord with the usage of sovereign govern-
ments. The power, as incident to the power of borrowing money
and issuing bills or notes of the government for money borrowed,
of impressing upon those bills or notes the quality of being a
legal tender for the payment of private debts, was a power uni-
versally understood to belong to sovereignty, in Europe and
America, at the time of the framing and adoption of the Consti-
tution of the United States.7 5
Again, Gray suggested that the judiciary had no power to inter-
fere with the legislature's decision thereby signifying agreements
with Congress, which recommended judicial restraint. It is in the
policy section of his opinion that Gray cited his one English case,
making it clear that he did not find it possible to use it as a prece-
dent but only as an illustration of modern governmental practices
as far as currency was concerned."6 It is equally clear that Gray
searched for precedents since he referred to the English Court of
Chancery but produced only a modern case brought there by a
foreign sovereign, the King of Hungary, to enjoin issue of paper
notes unless the King's license had been obtained. Gray looked
only to legal history and precedents about money. Perhaps he did
not find the history of money a persuasive argument either for
himself or for the contemporary opinion reading public. At the
time, social anthropology did not filter into judicial opinions so
that Gray did not treat money as a medium of exchange whether
it was in the form of shells used by the Indians or cows by ancient
farmers.7 Even today the use of social history in judicial opinions
draws criticism, as commentary of the Yoder opinion itself shows.
Conservative critics of the result Gray reached seemed to base
their objections on the notion that if Gray could not find strong
English, if not American, precedents allowing paper money, then
he had to alter his outcome and should not have argued from si-
lence that nothing in the Constitution prevented Congress from
issuing paper money.
It was the one important Gray decision which had no prece-
dents directly on point, and was therefore treated for critical pur-
poses as profoundly unhistorical. Thus, Charles Francis Adams
and George Bancroft "whose constitutional history Field quoted"
were violently against the decision. 8 In effect, Field was asking
75. Id. at 447.
76. Id.
77. A. BURNS, MONEY AND MONETARY POLICY IN EARLY TimES 4, 6 (1927).
78. Smith, Mr. Justice Horace Gray of the United States Supreme Court, 6 S. DAK.
L. REv. 221, 242-44 (1961). Bancroft's pamphlet denouncing Juilliard, entitled "A Plea
for the Constitution of the United States Wounded in the House of Its Guardians," is cited
by FILLER, supra note 66, at 1385.
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Gray to produce a specific history of the use of paper money in
the United States or invalidate its use. Justice Field's lone dissent,
which has been termed "vitriolic," 7' 9 is the basis for later histori-
ans' reference to the enmity between Field and Gray."0 But, al-
though his opinion has been tagged as unhistorical and dictated by
policy, it is possible to argue that Justice Gray, steeped in histori-
cal knowledge, made a more subtle use of history in Juilliard.8 '
Gray's knowledge of American constitutional history presented no
barrier to Congress's use of paper money as legal tender. That is,
Gray's "historical understanding provides the scaffolding used to
construct the opinion" so that the Justice "writes not of history
but in history."18 2 In different terms, Justice Gray's brother, Pro-
fessor John Chipman Gray, recognized this when he replied to
Charles Frances Adams' denouncement of Juilliard.8 3 Professor
Gray suggested that the outcome in Juilliard could be directly
traced to Adam's own grandfather who had appointed Marshall. 4
Indeed, the historical precedents upholding the national bank
require by analogy the same result in regard to paper money. In
this sense, Gray's "scaffolding" is historical because the issue is
virtually a replay of the congressional authority to charter and es-
tablish national banks. Justice Gray, with his deep sense of his-
tory, recognized that; but others not so well versed in history
failed to see either his judicious use of history or the role it played
in fashioning his "policies" which guided the result in Juilliard.
The historical scaffolding was well hidden. As a recent commenta-
tor reminded us, the quality of the judge's resolution of a problem
depends on the resources brought to the task so that historical
context provides the "way of understanding the significance of the
issues to be decided. 8 5 Here, Justice Gray's understanding of
Marshall's precedents provided both the approach to and the reso-
lution of congressional authority to issue paper money.
In learning the specific lessons of history and making them his
own, Gray constructed a broad approach to history. He was then
able to decide when the wider lessons of history, such as the anal-
ogy provided by the national bank, would permit a new practice.
The historian in Gray knew that the absence of narrow, specific
79. Davis & Davis, Mr. Justice Horace Gray: Some Aspects of His Judicial Career,
41 A.B.A. J. 421, 424 (1956).
80. See infra notes 114-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of Field's dissent.
81. Smith, supra note 78, at 244.
82. Id. at 341.
83. Id. at 244.
84. For a recent study of Marshall's treatment of history, see Bloch & Marcus, John
Marshall's Selective Use of History in Marbury v. Madison, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 301.
85. Sullivan, supra note 56, at 354.
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history should not stand as a barrier. Through his study of history,
Chief Justice Burger learned these same lessons and applied them
rightly or wrongly in the creche case without considering the spe-
cific history of the celebration of the history of Christmas which
Justice Brennan exhorted him to consider. The absence of specific
history for a particular practice does not present a barrier to jus-
tices steeped in history unless that practice (paper money, munici-
pal creches) discloses attendant harms.
B. Field's Use of Natural Law to Dissent from Post-Civil War
Liberalism
Justice Stephen Field had a completely different style of opin-
ion-writing from Justice Gray. His use of "natural law" facilitated
carrying out his own conception of the proper balance between
citizen and government and, further, within the branches of gov-
ernment, quite apart from the balance set forth in judicial prece-
dents. Rather than a chronological development of precedents,
Field developed his own structure of how the right balance was to
be calibrated, and in broader terms stated principles of political
philosophy on which the balance rested, even quoting in dissent
such political philosophers as John Stuart Mill and Adam
Smith.86
While this invocation of natural law gave Field much freedom
in dissent, it also perhaps led to his being misunderstood by his
contemporaries and modern commentators as well. Thus, com-
mentators have emphasized the primacy of either one of the two
major interpretations of Field's opinions: (1) the general principle
of natural law philosophy to which Field appealed and for which
he was extremely popular with such contemporary special interest
groups as capitalists or other propertied classes; and more re-
cently, (2) Field's balance of competing private, governmental and
intra-governmental interests as a technical legal jurisprudence.87
Field appears either as apologist for the laissez-faire economics of
86. Butchers' Union Slaughterhouse and Livestock Landing Co. v. Crescent City
Livestock Landing and Slaughterhouse Co., III U.S. 746, 757 (1884) (Field, J., concur-
ring) citing A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). Butchers' Union is a later, but re-
versed legislative power issue following on the famous Slaughterhouse Cases supra note
58; Juilliard, 110 U.S. at 466 (Field, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Field's natural law
jurisprudence, see C. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW Concepts 159-62 (1930).
For a recent discussion of the Slaughterhouse Cases see R. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND
CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1976, 143-66 (1985).
87. R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 28, at 87-88, 102, 172-73; McCurdy, supra note 30,
at 972, and Scheiber, supra note 28 at 357-60, 391-93. While McCurdy in effect sees Field
as a Jacksonian democrat, (R. MCCLOSKEY at 125) the labels "liberal" and "conservative"
may be usefully applied to contrast Gray and Field, respectively.
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the wealthy Gilded Age businessman or as a jurist drawing up
and interpreting guidelines to delineate the proper spheres of the
public and private sectors. In jurisprudential terminology, Field
felt that private business should neither be subsidized by govern-
ment nor subject to its regulation, and that government has the
duty, on the one hand, not to interfere in private business and, on
the other hand, not to alienate its powers, privileges, or publicly-
owned property. Both views reach essentially the same conclu-
sions, differing however, in their emphasis on political or jurispru-
dential terminology.
Thus, for example, in Munn, which later constituted such an
important precedent for Justice Gray, Justice Field dissented. To
the majority in Munn, the growing industrialization of the country
after the Civil War required great flexibility for legislatures to as-
sist in expansion and regulate its growth. Field looked beyond that
legislative regulation to the bases on which individual guarantees
of life, liberty and property were based. "If this (price regulation)
be sound law, if there be no protection, either in the principles
upon which our republican government is founded, or in the
prohibitions of the Constitution against such invasion of private
rights, all property and all business in the State are held at the
mercy of a majority of its legislature."88 Field denounced Munn as
a decision which "gives unrestrained license to legislative will."89
This phraseology lends itself to interpretation either as an estab-
lishment of the proper spheres of the public and private sectors or
as an expression of fear of tyranny by a majority hostile to
wealthy interests.
In a certain sense, the dichotomy between the two interpreta-
tions of Field is false because the majority in Munn had to decide
the extent of the legislature's regulatory power, and inevitably
that decision entailed a judgment about the Court's role as over-
seer of legislative involvement in industrial growth. The Court's
unwillingness or inability to oversee the reasonableness of legisla-
tive rate-making in all the states during the early period of indus-
trial expansion argued for initial flexibility and broad scope for
the legislatures to extend concessions to new industries while at
the same time preventing those industries from charging monopo-
88. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 140 (1877).
89. Id. at 148. The whole passage reads:
The legislation in question is nothing less than a bold assertion of absolute power
by the State control at its discretion the property and business of the citizen, and
fix the compensation he shall receive. The will of the legislature is made the condi-
tion upon which the owner shall receive the fruits of his property and the just
reward of his labor, industry, and enterprise.
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listic rates.9° The regular, and perhaps more immediate, electoral
process rather than judicial review was the early vehicle to fine-
tune the legislature's rate-making.
The majority was willing to draw all but the most obviously
confiscatory rate-making under the broad umbrella of the state's
"police power," permitting each state's legislature to give immedi-
ate and continuing attention to industrial developments. 91 Field,
however, wishing to restrict the legislature's role in industrial ex-
pansion, sought to place price regulation, not under the legisla-
ture's general police powers, but under the arguably more re-
stricted power of "eminent domain. '92 If the rate-making power
of the legislature were categorized as a taking, then the reasona-
bility of the rate as just compensation might be subject to judicial
review which would considerably narrow the legislature's rate-
making power. By categorizing price regulation in Munn as a po-
lice power rather than a taking, the Court deliberately provided
the legislature with a broad scope to respond quickly and flexibly
to rate-making needs. Field's espousal of an eminent domain solu-
tion to price regulation does not, however, resolve the question of
whether he was simply developing an abstract jurisprudence for
lines of demarcation between public and private interests or
whether this jurisprudence was designed to protect property in
most instances against the special interests of a confiscatory
majority.
The consistency of Justice Field's linedrawing itself is not in
question.9" In a 4-3 decision in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illi-
nois,9 4 Justice Field held that states lacked power to alienate pub-
lic lands. If a state gave away public lands its grant was void.
Therefore, the state could freely revoke its void grant. By the
same token, the liberal position was equally consistent. In dissent,
Justice Shiras with Justices Gray and Brown started from the
equally well-settled position that the state power to convey its land
was full so that its grants "are matters of legislative discretion." 95
Therefore, the revocation of the grant was in their view void.98
90. McCurdy, supra note 30, at 984.
91. Scheiber, supra note 28, at 398; R. GABRIEL, supra note 27, at 292 states that
the police power is a product of Jacksonian democracy.
92. Scheiber, supra note 28, at 374. The classic articles on eminent domain are:
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation of 'Just
Compensation,' HARV. L. REV. 1168 (1967); and Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny in Perspec-
tive: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63; A Legal
and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650 (1958).
93. Scheiber, supra note 28, at 393.
94. 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892).
95. Id. at 465, 467.
96. Id. at 475.
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Thus, the liberal position would have required the land to remain
alienated. Neither jurisprudence was simply based on aggrandiz-
ing the private or public interest; both sides consistently adhered
to their positions even when it required dispositions that might ap-
pear anomalous today if protection of property and legislation in
the public interest are abstracted from their nineteenth-century
contexts.
It is true, however, that even in the nineteenth century Field's
protection of property was abstracted from its jurisprudential con-
text. His concurring opinion in Butchers' Union Slaughter-house
and Livestock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Livestock Landing
and Slaughter-house Co.97 contained an extensive passage which
could be easily taken out of its factual setting. In a discussion of
the recognition in the Declaration of Independence that rights are
given "not by edicts of Emperors, or decrees of Parliament, or acts
of Congress, but 'by their Creator' ... ,"8 Field appeared to the
most broadly formulated conceptions. "As in our intercourse with
our fellow-men certain principles of morality are assumed to exist,
without which society would be impossible, so certain inherent
rights lie at the foundation of all action, and upon a recognition of
them alone can free institutions be maintained." 9 As if to set his
concurrence in a political context, he went on to quote from Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations, which categorized labor as "the most
sacred and inviolable" property.100 Field stated "I cannot believe
that what is termed in the Declaration of Independence a God-
given and an inalienable right can be thus ruthlessly taken from
the citizen, or that there can be any abridgement of that right
except by regulations alike affecting all persons of the same age,
sex, and condition." It is almost as though he had prepared this
opinion for reprinting in a political journal. Indeed, his Sinking
Fund dissent of 1878 had been republished as "Laws, Morals and
Common Sense."'' As commentators have recognized, Field com-
plained that the bar misconceived his views.' 2
Several other Supreme Court opinions were examined by both
progressives and conservatives. Such cases as Mugler v. Kansas'0 3
and Powell v. Pennsylvania,0 4 in which Field dissented, were re-
97. 111 U.S. 746 (1884).
98. Id. at 757.
99. Id. at 756.
100. Id. at 757 (quoting A. SMITH, 1 WEALTH OF NATION S at 137).
101. MCCLOSKEY, Stephen Field, 2 THE JUSTICES, supra note 28, at 1080.
102. McCurdy, supra note 30, at 978 (citing Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
129, 141 (1873), and Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 520 (1885)).
103. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
104. 127 U.S. 678 (1888).
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ceived optimistically by progressives and with fear by conserva-
tives. In the face of fourteenth amendment claims, Mugler upheld
the police power of the state legislature to prohibit continued use
of a working brewery. The Supreme Court gave recognition to
state power to alter various individual interests for the greater
good of society in general, that is for reasons of public interest.
Perhaps the Court upheld this absolute prohibition to cut down
on, if not prevent, the sale of intoxicants, which the Court noted
caused disease, poverty and crime, thereby harming the general
welfare of society.10 5 Field dissented on the ground that the state
deprived the owner of the use of his brewery property without due
process. He noted that the legislature's action was simply arbi-
trary. Field differentiated between confiscation and regulation and
did not hesitate to characterize the state's legislation as having
"crossed the line which separates regulation from confiscation."106
Powell perhaps constituted the high-water mark for legislative
discretion. A seller of oleomargarine was prosecuted for violating
the state statute which prohibited its sale. In defense, Powell
claimed that his product was nutritious, and denied misleading the
public into thinking that they were buying butter. Even so, the
Supreme Court looked at the absolute ban on margarine as gov-
ernmental necessity enacted under the police power for the good
of society. Unlike Gray in police power opinions, Field thought
that the Court had to protect society by overseeing regulations of
the legislature. 10 7 While Field had very sympathetic facts for this
dissent, the broad language of his dissent focussing on the consti-
tutional rights of the individual could be quoted generally to limit
the regulatory powers of the state.
His due process ground for judicial review was the fourteenth
amendment, but he ranged beyond the Constitution itself and
added the previously quoted language about God-given rights
from Butchers' Union.
I have always supposed that the gift of life was accompanied
with the right to seek and produce food, by which life can be
preserved and enjoyed, in all ways not encroaching upon the
equal rights of others. I have supposed that the right to take all
measures for the support of life, which are innocent in them-
selves, is an element of that freedom which every American citi-
zen claims as his birthright. I admit that previous to the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,
the validity of such legislation was to be determined by the con-
105. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 662.
106. Id. at 678.
107. Powell, 127 U.S. at 696-97 (Field, J., dissenting).
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stitution of the State,... 108
One commentator has observed that Field's "main dissenting
force was toward setting up a definite super-consitutional immu-
nity of private property from regulation in the public interest." 10 9
Included in these super-constitutional reasons were such economic
considerations as the competition of the cheaper "beef tallow, lard
or any other oleaginous substance" for the dairy manufacturer." 0
Thus Field could characterize the legislation in question as "noth-
ing less than an unwarranted interference with the rights and the
liberties of the citizen." '' Field's more specific regulatory juris-
prudence, which includes the promotion of competition and the
elimination of legislation favoring special industrial interest
groups, is subsumed under his more quotable broadly based ap-
peals to the inherent rights free citizens enjoy. Indeed, contempo-
rary legal reaction to Mugler and Powell was phrased in terms of
popular government versus laissez-faire. The state's lawyer in
Powell later wrote in democratic terms about the effective exer-
cise of governmental powers and American representative govern-
ment: "[T]he legislature, rather than the courts should determine
questions of public policy as to the possession of property and the
exercise of personal liberty."" 2 He also suggested that the alter-
native was unacceptable: "a laissez faire democracy is not a prac-
tical democracy." Similarly, conservatives attacked "that bound-
less, irresponsible force called 'the police power,'" wondering
whether liberty could "be maintained under a popular form of
government."" 3
Thus Gray's citations of precedents and narrowly-based legal
history may be interpreted as an affirmation of the post-Civil War
liberalism already under attack by conservatives, including Justice
Field in his repeated appeals to the citizen's natural law rights.
The divergences in their opinions, however, can be most readily
seen in Juilliard, for which Field is said to have criticized Gray
"in an unprintably robust phrase."" 4 Since there were no prece-
dents directly on point, Field, unlike Gray, broadened his concep-
tion of relevant history to include prior bad debts of the govern-
108. Id. at 692.
109. Nelles, Book Review, Stephen J. Field: Craftsman of the Law By Carl Brent
Swisher, 40 YALE L.J. 998, 1002 (1931).
110. Powell, 127 U.S. at 693.
111. Idat695.
112. Wintersteen, The Sovereign State, 28 Am. L. REG. (n.s.) 129, 138 (1889).
113. A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR
AND BENCH, 1187-1895. 35 (1961), (quoting the address of David Overmyer at the Janu-
ary, 1889, meeting of the Kansas Bar Association).
114. Nelles, supra note 109, at 998. See also C. SWISHER, STEPHEN J. FIELD:
CRAFTSMAN OF THE LAW 198-204 (1930).
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ment related to the notes issued in 1776. Because of those bad
debts, Congress did not attempt to issue notes again until 1862
during the Civil War. Field could not, however, use that history to
show that Congress had no power to issue notes. He had to con-
tent himself with attempting to confine the issuance of notes to
wartime and in strongly contemptuous rhetoric upbraided Gray
for regularizing an emergency procedure: "What was in 1862
called 'the medicine of the Constitution' has now become its daily
bread." '115 It is no accident that the words "daily bread," used in a
secular context, echoes the phrase from the Lord's prayer, "give
use this day our daily bread." At the same time, he heaped scorn
on the one Court of Chancery precedent Gray produced. "Until
some authority beyond the alleged claim and practice of the sover-
eign governments of Europe be produced," 116 Field refused to be-
lieve that Congress had the power to borrow money.
The remainder of Field's dissent concerned what he considered
economic laws about value and political philosophy. At the outset
and toward the end .of his opinion, Field suggested that economi-
cally speaking, the notes had value "only as they are converted
into coin"117 and whatever the notes bring in the market, "they
are not money in the sense of the Constitution."11 8 Furthermore,
Field painted the possibility of depreciation as a peculiar danger
always attendant on paper money, so much so that depreciation
appeared almost as an economic law for paper money.119 In refer-
ring to debasement of the coinage, Field first enlisted Mill to
characterize the government's action as robbery, and then stated
that the Constitution does not sanction "any intentional wrong to
the citizen."1 20 In opposition to Gray's analogy to national banks,
Field suggested that the power to coin money must be read in
connection with the prohibition on the states to make anything but
gold and silver coin as tender in payments of debts. 2' It suited his
purpose to follow the history of what had and had not been used
in the United States for legal tender whereas he was otherwise
frequently willing to depart from current practices. If Field
wished, as he did in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, to cir-
cumscribe the public sector and delineate its proper sphere, then
115. Juilliard, 110 U.S. at 458 (Field, J., dissenting). Davis & Davis, supra note 79,
at 424 point out that Field was using William Graham Sumner's expression that the coun-
try's medicine had become its daily bread.
116. Id. at 459.
117. Id. at 452.
118. Id. at 464.
119. Id. at 470.
120. Id. at 466.
121. Id. at 463
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his suggestion that Congress pay the notes as they mature and
avoid paying interest1 22 would succeed in controlling the legisla-
ture and would at the same time set the Court in a position of
primacy by declaring the act of elected representatives unconstitu-
tional. Field's final observation that no effective control over the
legislature would remain if they received the power to print
money, constituted perhaps his most serious doubt. It revolved
around the fact that paper money gives the legislature and execu-
tive ultimate discretion to increase debt dramatically, devaluing
the property of the individual citizen.
The same concern manifested itself in Field's concurrence in
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 123 which declared the
Income Tax Law of 1894 unconstitutional. Field found the tax
question even graver than the imposition of paper money. Again
he wrote in broad terms suitable for general quotation.
If the provisions of the Constitution can be set aside by an Act
of Congress, where is the course of usurpation to end? The pre-
sent assault upon capital is but the beginning. It will be the step-
ping-stone to others, larger and more sweeping, till our political
contests will become a war of the poor against the rich; a war
constantly growing in intensity and bitterness.124
The populists had advocated a tax on large incomes. It had
proved a popular measure at election time since some sectors of
the economy were faring poorly while industrialists prospered, yet
the current taxes fell equally on the poor and the rich. Whether
cast in political terms, as in the language just quoted, or in the
jurisprudential terms of delineating the public and private sectors,
Justice Field's approach to the solution of the major legal issues of
his day rested on an appeal to the reason and morality of his natu-
ral law principles.
Field thought through his positions and reduced them to princi-
ples which he could apply, whatever the specific facts of particular
litigation. He shares with Justice Brennan his basic jurispruden-
tial division of society into public and private sectors. Similarly,
both Justices felt that the absence of specific history precludes the
approval of new practices when the questioned practice (paper
money, municipal creches) threatened to blur the bright lines of
their natural law jurisprudence.
Thus in the nineteenth century, judges were readily able to se-
lect history or natural law as a way to explain their decisions on
governmental regulation of business and such other important
122. Id. at 470.
123. 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
124. Id. at 607.
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constitutional issues as the nature of citizenship and the national
currency. Field relied on natural law which allowed him to con-
struct a rational system independent of case-by-case adjudication.
Jurisprudentially he marked off the rights and duties of the gov-
ernmental sectors and differentiated them from the functions of
the private sector. Politically, his lines of demarcation gave private
business much freedom and protection from governmental inter-
ference so that he appeared to favor wealthy capitalists.
Gray, on the other hand, sought to couch his opinions in prece-
dential and historical terms whenever it proved possible. Because
the post-civil war precedents were pro-legislature, Gray looked
comparatively liberal. His use of history was often permissive, de-
siring to continue sovereign immunity, governmental regulation of
perceived social harms, (such as sale of liquor) and holding the
absence of specific history no barrier to congressional introduction
of paper money. The characteristics of each method, the jurispru-
dential delineation of such sectors as private and public and the
experience over time of particular practices, will already be famil-
iar when they reappear in different contexts in the methodologies
Burger and Brennan use to formulate their opinions.
IV. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES IN FIRST
AMENDMENT CASES IN THE BURGER COURT
Several general principles of Chief Justice Burger's jurispru-
dence emerge from his use of history in a variety of first-amend-
ment cases and law review articles. Most generally, the Chief Jus-
tice's attitude toward decision-making and leadership appear in
two brief historical examples. Chief Justice Burger defined the
problem of authority and decision-making as in part a matter of
finding the right time to achieve consensus. He quoted Justice Fe-
lix Frankfurter to the effect that a jurist has to find out "how to
be ahead of the procession, but not too much ahead as TR (Theo-
dore Roosevelt) said. If you're too far ahead, you've got no follow-
ers. If you're not ahead at all, then there's no leader.' 25 While
the Chief Justice recognized the dangers of "being right too
soon," he did not exclude risk-taking because progress and change
must nevertheless be made. 26
In a similar fashion, the Chief Justice was acutely aware of the
slowness of the human mind to assimilate constitutional develop-
ments. He saw an example of this slowness in General Robert E.
125. Burger, Thinking the Unthinkable, 31 LoY. L. REv. 205, 206 (1985) (quoting
from H. PHILLIPS, FELIX FRANKFURTER REMINISCES 238 (1960)).
126. Id.
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Lee, who was opposed to slavery and secession but who neverthe-
less chose to defend Virginia rather than the nation. The observa-
tion that almost a century after the Revolution, paramount loyalty
to a state and not the nation "was still the frame of mind of a
great many people" 12 7 suggested to the Chief Justice a need for
caution in judicial decision-making respecting constitutional ques-
tions in which, unlike the Civil War, we have the opportunity to
accommodate slowness and avoid judicial destruction of the fabric
of our constitutional compromises. Our constitutional fabric thus
requires delicate handling, since our freedoms are often "in jeop-
ardy." 128 All legitimate authority, including the judiciary, is based
on leadership which assents to persuasive traditions, institutional
heritage and legal precedent. In this way the Chief Justice does
not concentrate simply on the intent of the Framers of the Consti-
tution, but makes a broad examination of continuing constitu-
tional development in the generations following the Framers. 129
History therefore plays a very important role in Chief Justice
Burger's constitutional jurisprudence. In more theoretical terms,
history transmits American constitutional values from the Fram-
ers to the present generation of Americans and beyond. History
thus was central to the Chief Justice's decision-making and ex-
plaining. Since Chief Justice Burger did not himself make any
declaration espousing the value of history in his own views, it is
instructive to examine a representative example of political
thought in which history plays a similar role, the writings of Ed-
mund Burke,13 ° without, however, attributing the views of Burke
to the Chief Justice. Burke held that both society and government
are natural, and that the individual in the totality of his needs has
a place for the state, local community and family, and that within
the context of their time and society, individuals have concrete
natural rights 31 guided by experience. In establishing governmen-
tal institutions, "mind must conspire with mind" over long periods
of time.132 Burke's experiential, concrete bias attuned itself to his-
tory, and he erected "a presumption in favor of any settled scheme
of government against any untried project" when that nation has
127. Corry, Chief Justice Burger on CBS News Special, New York Times, July 9,
1986. See also, Brennan, A Tribute to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, 17 SETON HALL L.
REv. 3 (1987) who observes that several of Burger's opinions "reflected his conviction that
it is wrong to live without some deep abiding social commitment, and explain[ed] how
thoroughly he devoted his professional life to pursuit of the elusive goal of freedom."
128. Burger, supra note 8, at 1.
129. Id. at 2.
130. E. BURKE, THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (1901).
131. Schwartz, Edmund Burke and the Law, 95 LAW. Q. REv. 355, 365 (1979).
132. W. HARRISON, CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE: HISTORY OF BRITISH POLITICAL
THOUGHT, 1593-1900, 111 (1965).
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long existed and flourished under the settled scheme. 133 The Con-
stitution is interpreted though the "collected reason of the ages,"
and applied to particular and varied cases.1 34 Thus traditions and
institutions link one generation to the next as "repositories of the
wisdom of the past" and conveniences when the same problems
recur.,3 5 Consent and stability arise not only from safeguards
against arbitrary power, but also from compromises as well as
natural sloughing off of obsolete practices, and gradual accept-
ances of reform. 38 Both Burke and Chief Justice Burger were in-
terested in jury and prison reform.137
For the Chief Justice some safeguards against arbitrary power
arise from the independence and accountability of the judiciary
itself. The Chief Justice referred to "the centuries-old struggle to
establish and maintain a strong, independent judiciary," which
has emerged as a mainstay of American freedoms. 38 The judici-
ary, as a coequal third branch under the Constitution, is assured
of its independence. Its accountability appears in its opinions, and
thus history is not only an expression of the jurisprudential values
of such judges as, for example, Chief Justice Burger, but is also a
method of explaining judicial decisions to the nation in terms of
our own national history. In this way, history also serves a sym-
bolic function in judicial opinions.
A. Independent Democratic Institutions: Open Trials and
Accountable Judiciary
"The Constitution defines and mandates rights but it cannot ex-
ecute or enforce them.' 39 It takes the energy of free people and
institutions to realize constitutional goals. In the open-trial cases,
the peculiar fact that openness was not expressly guaranteed as a
fundamental constitutional right occasioned an exhaustive recital
of history in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.' ° Chief Jus-
tice Burger in his plurality opinion began not with the American
experience but with moots in Anglo-Saxon England in order to
demonstrate that "throughout its evolution, the trial has been
133. Id.
134. Id. at 114.
135. Id. at 129.
136. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 16-18, 20 (1975).
137. Schwartz, supra note 131, at 362. Burger, supra note 7, at 5, and Burger, Com-
mencement Address, 4 PACE L. REV. 1, 2-9 (1983).
138. Burger, The Interdependence of Judicial and Journalistic Independence, 63
GEO. L.J. 1195, 1197 (1975).
139. Id.
140. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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open to all who cared to observe."141 Similarly, Burger uses avail-
able colonial records to indicate that open trials were sometimes
considered "fundamental law. 1 42 Furthermore, the Chief Justice
cites foreign observers' praise of open English trials to underline
the beneficial effects of open trials as public policy. The purpose of
this extensive historical survey is to negate the possibility that
open trials were "a quirk of history" when "our organic laws were
adopted. 1 43 Even when public policy was framed less psychologi-
cally, "people sensed from experience and observation"' 44 that
public acceptance of the trial procedure itself was necessary to
prevent vigilantism and promote community catharsis, serving the
function of satisfying the appearance of justice. From the survey,
one can conclude that the Framers simply failed to draft an open
trial clause through oversight.1 45
In these circumstances, the use of history provides a Burkean
presumption that open trials should not be destroyed, and thus
indicated the Court's respect for long standing customs that con-
tinue to function well. "From this unbroken, uncontradicted his-
tory, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, we
are bound to conclude that a presumption of openness inheres in
the very nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice."' 46
The Chief Justice went even further along the lines of a Burkean
analysis by showing that this judicial acceptance of open trial, al-
though not based on direct judicial precedent, is "hardly novel.' 47
The Chief Justice indicates that the law itself implicitly validated
the openness of trials as part of "the common law tradition."
Therefore the constitutionalization of the open trial did not estab-
lish an unwarranted departure from custom itself and prior judi-
cial decision-making. Nevertheless, the conclusion that open trials
should be given constitutional status is further established symbol-
ically as an institution of "democratic society."'' 48
The need for this symbolic use of history is made clear by the
fact that Virginia not only acted to close a trial contrary to the
presumption but continued to press its contention in the Supreme
Court. Here history pointed to establishing procedures for the ex-
ercise of legitimate authority, even if it did not lead the Court to
141. Id. at 564.
142. Id. at 567.
143. Id. at 569.
144. Id. at 571.
145. But see the dissent by Justice Rehnquist which suggests not all procedures have
to be uniform. Id. at 605-06.
146. Id. at 571.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 573, n.9 (Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 920
(1950)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)).
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establish an absolute requirement of open trials. Thus the Court
set up a requirement only of extensive judicial examination 'of a
request for a closed trial. The need to explain the decision further
required a search for the proper amendment under which to con-
sider the value of open trials. The location of open trials as one of
a complex of first amendment values all sharing a common de-
nominator provided more than the usual need for symbolism.
Freedom of the press itself was set forth as one of the key values
of a democratic society. The special role of the press in populariz-
ing the need for an independent judiciary has been given special
recognition by the Chief Justice.149 Thus the press and, by associ-
ation, open trials turn into a bulwark of our national freedoms.
The role of historic importance in making it clear to the new na-
tion that an independent judiciary was a necessary ingredient of
government limited the scope of the open trial right the Chief Jus-
tice was willing to give. Open trial simply receives constitutional
recognition and by analogy is in that complex of freedom of as-
sembly and the press.
Justice Brennan, on the other hand, observes no such historical
limitations. His policy orientation frees him from seeing open tri-
als only as a parallel to the established first amendment's free-
doms. In that way, once history is satisfied the requirement of ex-
tensive pre-closure examination is almost a threshold inquiry
because these related first amendment values are all reinterpreted
in light of contemporary problems relating to freedom of informa-
tion about any governmental exercise of power. Rewritten as a
freedom of information issue, the notion of open trials inevitably
requires an even stronger presumption of openness. Given such a
policy, the individual's fair trial claim for newspaper publicity
which might influence the jury would have to be extraordinary.
On the actual outcome of this case, policy and history, or "logic
and experience,"' 150 reached the same conclusion, but the policy of
providing access to governmental information meant in the first
theory access by the press, an even more powerful concept in its
own right. It was thus easy to subsume the Burkean characteriza-
tion of open trials as one institution, along with freedom of assem-
bly and the press, playing a historic role in a democratic society
under the umbrella of the media's rights of access. In such a set-
ting Burkean rebuttable presumptions harden into the absolutes of
policy.
Unlike the religion cases examined below, the open trial cases
lose the initial case-by-case determination presumed in Richmond
149. Burger, supra note 138, at 1198.
150. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
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Newspapers, and later cases are considered from the perspective
of the media's rights of access. Thus in Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court,151 the logical requirements of Justice Brennan's
principle of public access to governmental information deny minor
victims of sex crimes closure for testifying. The practical effect of
the Massachusetts statute was to deny live television 152 coverage
of the trial but not to hamper newspapers 53 which functionally
could only print or digest transcripts even with their reporters pre-
sent at the live trial. Chief Justice Burger in dissent, however,
started with the Richmond presumption and balanced against it
the historical protections given to minors. The extension of the
protections given to minor defendants would have rebutted the
presumption of open trials. History is decisive for the Chief Jus-
tice in Globe. Both his major arguments for closure were histori-
cal: 1) "[there is clearly a long history of exclusion of the public
from trials involving sexual assaults, particularly those against mi-
nors;"154 and 2) "[i]t would misrepresent the historical record to
state that there is an 'unbroken, uncontradicted history' of open
proceedings in cases involving the sexual abuse of minors. 155 The
Chief Justice shows a characteristic concern with the symbolic
function of explaining decisions so that public acceptance of the
decision would follow. 5
Similarly, Justice Brennan was concerned with public under-
standing of the opinion. His general principle of freedom of access
to governmental information prevented any uncertainties the me-
dia might feel about the Court's support for their claim to special
protection in the area of access to information.1 57 On the one
hand, Chief Justice Burger's historical approach carves out an ex-
ception to accommodate minor victims, their families and those
who wish to see traditional family values of protecting minors
honored. On the other hand, Justice Brennan's policy of access to
governmental information supports the actual role and symbolic
151. Id. at 615.
152. Id. at 614.
153. Id. at 616.
154. Id. at 614. "Many will find it difficult to reconcile the concerns so often ex-
pressed for the rights of the accused with the callous indifference exhibited today for chil-
dren who, having suffered the trauma of rape or other sexual abuse, are denied the modest
protection the Massachusetts Legislature provided."
155. Id. (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 55, 573 (1980)).
156. Id. at 613.
157. See, e.g., Emerson, Freedom of the Press Under the Burger Court in THE BUR-
GER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 22, 123 (V. Blasi ed,. 1983) [here-
inafter THE BURGER COURT]: "There are no clear indications from Richmond Newspapers
and Globe how far a majority of the Court is prepared to go in supporting a consitutional
right of the press to obtain information from the government. .. . On the whole, despite
Richmond Newspapers, the prognosis is not favorable."
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stature of the media as the group most centrally interested in the
use of that information. To the Chief Justice, history opens the
door to flexibility but paramount loyalty to abstract standards sig-
nals rigidity.'58 Justice Brennan holds out the charm and attrac-
tiveness of unswerving faith to his principles wherever they may
lead. This lends his views the moral stature, along with the intol-
erance, of a purist.
In Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,159 Chief Justice Bur-
ger returned to the same type of historical analysis he used in
Richmond Newspapers. Here the history of open trials focused on
the role of the jury as a democratic institution of importance to
the criminal justice system. Thus jury selection must be open. In a
later case involving the same parties 60 there was no jury to be
selected. Only the question of access to a preliminary hearing was
involved. The Chief Justice attempted a similar approach but
there was a paucity of history thus leaving the Chief Justice with
virtually only the exceptional example of the open preliminary
hearing of Aaron Burr. Nevertheless, the Globe case showed that
even in the face of contradictory history, policy or "logic" de-
manded a premium for the value of openness. Armed with the
Globe precedent and knowing that the press was nevertheless not
reassured by Globe'6' alone, the Chief Justice adapted Justice
Brennan's policy and logic to require openness as a usual policy in
the preliminary hearings in all states. Globe thus filled the histori-
cal void in Press Enterprise. In the absence of history, the
Burkean value of compromise as an indication of the exercise of
legitimate authority leads to a perhaps unexpected result.'62 Press
Enterprise II is a particularly unusual opinion because it departs
from Chief Justice Burger's adherence to the moral value of his-
torical precedent in first amendment cases. The departure is occa-
sioned by the Globe precedent which permits the policy of reassur-
ing the press to enjoy pre-eminence over the other values
protected during the course of history. The value of independent
journalism receives important consideration in Chief Justice Bur-
ger's framework of freedoms.
Indeed, Chief Justice Burger related the independence of the
158. Globe, 457 U.S. at 614, 615: "Today Justice Brennan ignores the weight of
historical practice for the "wooden application of the rigid standard [the Court] asserts."
159. 464 U.S. 501 (1984). Burger also used the same approach in McDonald v.
Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring at 485).
160. Press Enterprise I1, 106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986).
161. Emerson, supra note 157, at 22, 25.
162. Justice Stevens dissenting in Press Enterprise I1, 106 S.Ct. at 2750 suggests
that the inconclusiveness of the history should have led to an exception for preliminary
hearings which in some states are the functional equivalents of grand juries.
1988]
31
McCauliff: Constitutional Jurisprudence of History and Natural Law: Compleme
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
press to the independence of the judiciary.163 For example, in
United States v. Will,1 64 federal judges challenged the validity of
Congressional freezes of previously enacted cost-of-living increases
in judicial salaries under the compensation clause of the Constitu-
tion. Despite the clarity of the clause, the Court nevertheless re-
hearsed the policies which over the course of time gave to us judi-
cial independence as a guarantee of Constitutional right for
litigants in the face of pressure from other governmental branches
or public opinion. This is Chief Justice Burger's recognition that
judicial independence is not absolute. Review even for the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court can be had in Congress and through
constitutional amendments. Therefore, public explanation of the
Court's decisions takes on symbolic importance and Supreme
Court opinions attempt to put the decisions in context, often in
historical context.
B. Independence for Families and Schools
"Parents first season us: then schoolmasters deliver us to laws
....,65 This observation reflecting the experience of the meta-
physical poet George Herbert dovetails into the theme of reliance
on history in cases involving the institutions of families and
schools.
In Parham v. J.R.,1 66 which sought to establish the rights of
minors being committed to mental hospitals, Chief Justice Burger
referred generally to the traditional primary role families had
played in the history of western civilization in bringing up chil-
dren. He looked at this role as a source of jurisprudence on family
life in general. "Our jurisprudence historically has reflected West-
ern civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad paren-
tal authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently fol-
lowed that course; our constitutional system long ago rejected any
notion that a child is "the mere creature of the State...,e Chief
Justice Burger could have cited legal precedents at length to show
how this view of western civilization became incorporated into the
jurisprudence of family law, and could have given many opposing
historical examples of how parents failed to act in the best inter-
ests of the child. He simply referred to the age-old role of parents
163. Burger, supra note 138, at 1196. Burger states that the press pointed up the
need for judges after federation, and since then, the judiciary has protected consitutional
freedoms, including freedom of the press. Emerson, supra note 157, at 1198-99.
164. 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
165. G. HERBERT, Sinne (I) in THE WORKS OF GEORGE HERBERT 45 (F. Hutchinson
ed. 1941).
166. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
167. Id. at 602.
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as the norm for initiating even mental health care in much the
same way as George Herbert assumed parents' primary role, and
added the invocation of history to that universally accepted basic
norm. The question, of course, was the scope of the parents' role,
now that more is known about mental health.
Here history provided merely a rebuttable presumption that the
parents' role is primary.
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that par-
ents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and ca-
pacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions.
More important, historically it has recognized that natural
bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of
their children. (citations omitted).
As with so many other legal presumptions, experience and re-
ality may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point; the
incidence of child neglect and abuse cases attests to this.'"8
In looking to experience as a test of the jurisprudential presump-
tions of history in upholding the role of the family in bringing up
children, Chief Justice Burger took a Burkean approach, and
found that "those pages of human experience" show that over-all
"parents generally do act in the child's best interest.' 6 9 Accord-
ing to Chief Justice Burger this was not a situation which he
deemed required a great departure from past practice or even a
long justification to show why it was unnecessary to depart from
historic practice in this instance, when adults sought psychiatric
institutionalization of a child.
The Chief Justice did, however, cite170 the then very recent case
of Addington v. Texas,17' decided at a time when courts were fre-
quently presented with the opportunity to provide symbolic recog-
nition of such personal rights as liberty, juvenile status, citizenship
and parental custodial rights by requiring an enhanced standard
of proof before termination of the right in question was permit-
ted.' 72 Nevertheless Justice Burger found the regular test, the best
interest of the child, sufficient without the additional procedures of
notice and an advesarial hearing which was requested for the chil-
dren. The second part of the opinion, reviewing the adequacy of
the medical process, once parents seek psychiatric treatment for
their child, did not involve history, and thus is not analyzed here.
Burger's allusion to "broad parental authority" in raising chil-
168. Id.
169. Id. at 602-03.
170. Id. 600-01, 609, 619.
171. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
172. Id. at 423; See McCauliff, Burdens of Proof. Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evi-
dence, or Constitutional Guarantees? 35 VAND. L. Rv. 1293, 1319-20 (1952).
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dren left the field open for critics to interpret "authority" as au-
thoritarian parental roles. Burgers' use of history in Parham has
been challenged as a politically motivated institutional response to
modern familial disintegration with an idealization of authoritari-
anism in a romantically popular reconstruction of an unrealized
golden age of family life.173 According to a leading family law
commentator, the popular history of parenting which the Court
accepts is now being revised. 17 4 The commentator sees an endorse-
ment of authoritarianism in the Court's shorthand explanation to
the opinion-reading public that due process is not served by ad-
ding an additional layer of adversarial hearings to commitment
when most parents who seek psychiatric care for their children are
not simply choosing to avoid their parental responsibilities by
warehousing their children in mental hospitals.
In that sense, the commentator's claim attempts to prove too
much, even though activists have failed to obtain additional sym-
bolic and constitutional reassurances that the child's interest is
unusually important. The Court acknowledged that parents and
the state with its wards may fail to act in the best interests of the
child. At greater potential risk is the child with "no adult who
knows him thoroughly and cares for him deeply," 175 although the
state is statutorily mandated to act in the best interests of the
child. The Court held itself ready to examine the case of the child
at risk if the record and evidence showed the state used the
mental hospitals to alleviate a dearth of foster homes. Thus Jus-
tice Burger sets his brief allusion to the authority of the family in
western history in the context of showing that the situation in
question required no exceptional treatment. It is equally possible
to read his refusal to add another layer of state procedures as lit-
eral adherence to the family values jurisprudence has incorporated
from the history of western civilization. The commentator's inter-
pretation of authority as authoritarian involves a substitution of
the oppressive parts of family history for the total picture of fam-
ily history, together with the assumption that the Court itself sin-
gled out that part of family history when it referred simply to the
history of concept of the family in western civilization. A large
portion of the wide group of readers of Supreme Court opinions
may nevertheless have been reassured by the Court's shorthand
allusion to "broad parental authority" that would not unduly in-
terfere with the historic role of parents in bringing up children.
173. Burt, The Burger Court and the Family, in THE BURGER COURT, supra note
157, at 92, 102.
174. Id. at 93.
175. 442 U.S. at 618.
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The same commentator found Justice Brennan's espousal of an
adversarial hearing in Parham an outgrowth of his concern with
the judicial role itself rather than the problems of family law. x7 6
According to him, Justice Brennan "invokes a characteristically
conflated vision of the commanding force of rationality and in-
flated view of reason's judicial embodiment." 1 7 In this view, Jus-
tice Brennan is simply substituting judicial authority for parental
and other traditional sources of authority which Chief Justice
Burger relied upon. It is, however, characteristic of the moral
stance of the natural lawyer to take a central role in fashioning
which currently accepted norms should be changed and what
those reformed norms should be.178 In doing so, the adherent of
natural law uses his or her faculty of reason to assess the validity
of the norms.7 9 Since opinion writing requires any judge to set
forth reasons to support the decision, the enhanced significance of
the role of reasoning to the natural lawyer may be overlooked.
Therefore, it must be emphasized that Justice Brennan in trying
to align societal norms and procedures with his rights-based view
of natural law is not so much inflating the judicial role as assert-
ing his own moral stance. The role of reason in natural law theory
is to bring the moral faculty of judgment into the decision making
process. 180 While the role of the judge as moralizer may or may
not be exaggerated in Justice Brennan's jurisprudence it appears
to arise not so much out of a simple egotistical view of the world
from a judicial perspective as from the natural law theory Justice
Brennan espouses.'
The history of the family was also central to explaining the dis-
position in Yoder v. Wisconsin.182 According to Yoder, a strong
family life and tradition can assume greater than usual familial
responsibility such as the vocational education of the family's
teenage children. "History is exalted in America permitting the
past to become moral interpreter of the present."'8 3 For the moral
symbolism of history to convince the opinion reader, however, the
reader must be convinced that history is accurately presented. "In
gaining assent to decisions, history has to be right or it will dis-
176. Burt, supra note 173, at 106.
177. Id.
178. Gewirth, The Ontological Basis of Natural Law: A Critique and an Alterna-
tive, 29 AM.J. JURIS. 95, 96 (1984) and infra notes 252-54.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See Brennan, supra note 14 and text accompanied by infra notes 252-53.
182. 406 U.S. 206 (1972).
183. MILLER, supra note 17, at 180. See also BUTTERFIELD, supra note 6, at 64-65,
and R. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 20 (1923).
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turb people who care about the history."'18 4 Thus unlike legal pre-
cedent, which we realize we reinterpret in accordance with need
and changing views over time, we wish to assume that interpreta-
tions of history itself do not change. Commentators, however, have
shown that interpretations of history change in accordance with
the questions we pose today about the past and in disputes be-
tween historians about the interpretation of controversial histori-
cal points. 185
In Yoder, the history of the Amish as a religious sect was rele-
vant to the free exercise of their religion. Their long-standing
commitment to a rural way of life and their tradition of separa-
tion from the rest of American society stood out for Chief Justice
Burger as central to the continuance of the sect. Justice Douglas
in dissent, however, mentioned drinking, the attractions of modern
life for young Amish who wished to abandon tradition and the
conflicts within the group. 18  The selectivity of the family history
presented in Yoder has laid the opinion open to criticism. Again,
the same leading family law commentator suggested that Yoder is
to be understood as part of a complex of opinions authored by
several different conservative Justices to mean that the conserva-
tive Justices admire only authoritarian management of children.8 7
Therefore, the underlying motivation for idealizing family life was
said to be a misdirected, if well-meant, attempt to restore confi-
dence in the fragile integrity and weak viability of the modern
family as part of the legitimacy of all traditional authority.,88 In
part, the commentator made his argument of authoritarianism
from recent historical studies that claimed family life was histori-
cally as weak and unstable as it appears today. 8 9 Since Chief Jus-
tice Burger and other members of the Court who wrote opinions
on family law rehearsed the older views that the family had a
strong, happy history, the commentator assumed that history was
being used to uphold traditional authority in order to channel the
opinion-reading public to be strong parents or at least to support
parental authoritarianism. 190 That desire to find an over-all unitive
184. M. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT
IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 4 (1965).
185. Yablon, The Indeterminacy of the Law: Critical Legal Studies and the Prob-
lent of Legal Explanation, CARDOZO L. REV. 917, 925-29, 944 (1985); Nelson supra note
54, at 1237.
186. 406 U.S. at 245-47 (Douglas, J., dissenting). It should be noted that Justice
Brennan concurred in the opinions by Justices Stewart and White, but did not write an
opinion himself.
187. Burt, supra note 173, at 95.
188. Id. at 98-100, 102-03.
189. Id. at 93 and 289, n.11.
190. Id. at 93 and 103.
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theme in the Burger Court's family law opinions made Chief Jus-
tice Burger's recitation of the history of the Amish sect and their
family life carry a freight it cannot bear-that the opinion used
history to further a value the commentator deemed "conserva-
tive," namely "authoritarianism."''
It is more likely the Chief Justice was simply saying that in
light of the long history of the Amish as a religious sect in this
country and the relatively recent state interest in compelling chil-
dren's attendance at public schools for one or two years of high
school, the evidence in the case must present some harm to war-
rant overturning ancient practice. 92 Furthermore, it is more likely
that on overall assessment, the cases of the Burger Court lack a
unitive, interpretive theme. 193 Thus, when a long-standing practice
is continued to the present, the Court will uphold that practice
unless considerations of policy or a current harm militate against
continuity; those cases in which history is strong may contradict
the holdings in other cases which seem to deal with similar
problems but which, however, lack strong historical support.'
In this particular case, Chief Justice Burger's allusion to the
familial and religious history of the Amish is designed only to
show that uniformity throughout America is not required unless
the uniform solution is remedying a greater harm. Of course, to
show that the Amish were doing no harm, the Chief Justice
painted history with a broad brush. It is easy enough to pick holes
in general history by showing that at least today the problems of
the modern world invade even historically isolated idiosyncratic
cultural and religious subgroups. Chief Justice Burger's allusion to
the Amish's long history of separation in effect established a legal
standard which meant that the Amish way of life would have to
be no longer viable in order to impose the ordinary educational
requirements on them. Since the only harm the state complained
about was the Amish's claim to an exception to the required state
school attendance policy, the general history of the Amish was
sufficient to overcome the state's policy of uniform high school at-
tendance. It is not necessary for us to assume that Chief Justice
Burger alluded to the history of the Amish people in order to pro-
mote or approve authoritarianism, or even to think that Chief Jus-
tice Burger himself believed the Amish people had a happy his-
tory living a rural way of life. He only had to show that the
191. Id. at 99 and 290, n.25.
192. 406 U.S. at 225-26.
193. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L.
Rav. 1436 (1987).
194. Id.
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Amish had a history of independence and self-sufficiency in order
to continue the exception to compulsory high school attendance,
and that otherwise the idiosyncratic religious sect would be de-
stroyed. Given that judicial purpose, Chief Justice Burger's gener-
alized historical outline of the Amish sect was sufficient.
Nor did Chief Justice Burger have to write a treatise on the
ease and happiness of early American rural life. History itself was
not the point of the opinion, and it is too easy for professional
historians to demand recognition in judicial opinions of what we
would write in a historical monograph."9 5 Thus, Burger is criti-
cized for having "a historically inaccurate conception of the suc-
cessful achievement of this simple harmonious life in early Ameri-
can history.""' Indeed, the ease, success and happiness of rural
life in early American history was not at issue in Yoder. Nor was
the speculation that these were goals, achieved or unachieved, rel-
evant to Yoder.197 Simply put, the fact that the Amish survived by
living that way of life based on their religious ideals was all that
was needed to give them an exception to compulsory public high
school attendance. In that sense, history served its purpose in the
Yoder case quite well.
Finally, in the recent Bethel School District v. Frazer,98 Chief
Justice Burger sets forth the "role and purpose of the American
public school system" 199 in a democratic society, particularly in
school assemblies. The importance of the history of civilized be-
havior in public life provides the foundation for public schools "to
prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public dis-
course." 200 Thus the Manual of Parliamentary Practice drafted by
Thomas Jefferson and adapted by the House of Representatives
provides Chief Justice Burger with a historical analogy to discuss
the scope of regulatory authority for school officials to protect
children and inculcate values of acceptable expression in public
discourse under the first amendment.20 1 Again this is not legal his-
tory, but Chief Justice Burger quickly turned to an examination of
the legal precedents on schools and free speech. Justice Brennan
concurred in order to limit the Court's holdings to the facts of this
case. According to him orderliness rather than the content of the
195. C. MILLER, supra note 17, at 201.
196. Burt, supra note 173, at 102, 290, note 35.
197. Id. at 102. Burt suggests that a simple harmonious life has been an "ideal for
community and for family life as a normative goal espoused throughout our national his-
tory, a goal that is sometimes more and sometimes less emphasized." Id.
198. 106 S. Ct. 3159. (1986).
199. Id. at 3164.
200. Id. at 3165.
201. Id. at 3164.
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speech permitted the school authorities to decide that the stu-
dent's speech was disruptive. 202
History is particularly useful in explaining the special role of
the family and in giving historic recognition to familial values. Fa-
milial history may be more relevant in judicial opinions when
families seem to be drifting rather than providing strong support
of the nurturing of children. In this sense, the use of such social
history in legal opinions may indicate more than the position the
Court wished to take in the case at hand, and may, as a leading
commentator suggests, reveal the judicial values that the opinion
writer himself holds. It is difficult, however, to conclude that the
preferred judicial value is authoritarianism. It is more credible to
conclude that the moral value in question is continuity rather than
disruption of opinion, practices, and values society deeply holds.
C. Independence for Religion and State
"[N]o scholar or judge of intellectual rectitude should answer
establishment clause questions as if the historical evidence permits
complete certainty. It does not. 203 Because modern historians, as
well as the Framers, and Americans then and now did not, and do
not, share one view, the abundance of the historical evidence only
adds to the frustration of writing and reading judicial opinions
construing the establishment clause.20 4 The major question then
for these cases is whether it is appropriate to use history as a kind
of parol evidence to construe the ambiguities of the establishment
clause.
Justice Brennan almost always answers this question in the neg-
ative, since he "will probably find a violation of the establishment
clause" whatever test is used.205 He is guided by his own rights-
based natural law philosophy in which he is concerned with the
abstract freedom of religion of all citizens from the state and the
rights of every denomination. In that way, the right of any partic-
202. Id. at 3168.
203. L. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
xiii (1986).
204. Id. at 123. "Except, perhaps, for Congregational New England, most of the
nation believed that an establishment of religion violated religious liberty. The House ap-
proved of Madison's proposal [on freedom of religion] but the Senate voted it down ... so
far as the United States Constitution was concerned, the states were free to recreate the
Inquisition or to erect and maintain exclusive establishments of religion, at least until rati-
fication of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868." Id. (footnote omitted.)
Levy presents a cogent argument for a broad interpretation of the establishment clause.
W. BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1976)
presents a much narrower view of the establishment clause, arguing that it was simply
designed to prevent favoritism of one denomination over another.
205. L. LEvy, supra note 203, at 129.
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ular denomination may be weighed in the circumstances in ques-
tion.2°0 In the absence of a consensus in the country and on the
Court, Chief Justice Burger is willing to use history to carve out
exceptions to what might otherwise be a literal-minded interpreta-
tion of the clause to invalidate a long-standing practice. Did Chief
Justice Burger have a duty to refrain from using history to fashion
a five-to-four majority which will uphold a long-standing excep-
tion to what might otherwise appear to current eyes a violation of
the establishment clause? Can a professional historian legiti-
mately consider the Court's use of history in these circumstances
a disservice?
In two recent opinions, Justice Brennan objected that history
should not be considered because it prevented the establishment
clause from being broadly applied. In Marsh v. Chambers,20 7 the
Court upheld a state's payment for a legislative chaplain. Chief
Justice Burger noted that the practice "is deeply embedded in the
history and tradition of this country. From colonial times through
the founding of the Republic and ever since, the practice of legis-
lative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment
and religious freedom." 208 The Chief Justice attached great
weight, though not an irrebuttable presumption,20 9 to "an unbro-
ken practice."210 He considered Justice Brennan's argument that
the messages of history are ambiguous and therefore should not
carry great weight,211 but stated:
"[w]e do not agree that evidence of opposition to a measure
weakens the force of the historical argument; indeed it infuses it
with power by demonstrating that the subject was considered
carefully and the action not taken thoughtlessly, by force of long
tradition and without regard to the problems posed by a plural-
istic society. '212
Justice Brennan argues not so much about the accuracy of the
history Chief Justice Burger presents, but starts from his own nat-
ural-law reference point that religion and the state serve two sepa-
rate functions which cannot overlap. He argues that "any of the
formal 'tests'" the Court has established as guidelines for its deci-
sion-making could be used to strike down the old practice of paid
legislative chaplains. 1 3 From his natural law perspective, Justice
Brennan does not wish to give legal recognition to the historically
206. Id. at 141-42.
207. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
208. Id. at 786.
209. Id. at 790.
210. Id. at 790 (quoting Watz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970)).
211. Id. at 791 (quoting Abington, 374 U.S. at 237 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 796.
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different practice, which would prevent universal applicability of
his principle that the wall of separation between religion and the
state provides not only mutually exclusive legal categories but also
that life must be governed according to those categories. In effect,
his rhetorical statement that "any group of law students" '21 could
"nearly unanimously"2 15 apply the tests correctly underscores his
commitment to syllogistic application of the establishment clause
tests. That is the "path of formal doctrine," as Justice Brennan
puts it.216 In accordance with his natural law stance, Justice Bren-
nan claims more than logical validity for his position. He specifi-
cally invokes morality which forms such an important part of nat-
ural law jurisprudence. The "moral intuitions" which gave rise to
the establishment clause make "... a statement about the proper
role of government ... which is public and religion which is
private. For Brennan prayer can only be private,218 and thus Bren-
nan cannot shake his conviction "that legislative prayer violates
both the letter and the spirit of the Establishment Clause. '219
Therefore, Justice Brennan condemns the Court's deference to
history on these separate grounds. He objects to any history not
directly related to the establishment clause itself, which support-
ers of both broad and narrow interpretations admit is ambiguous.
History is too broadly painted in this particular respect. Secondly,
he objects to the Court's treatment of its historical examination of
the first amendment "simply as an Act of Congress" because the
states forced the Bill of Rights on Congress. 2 History is too nar-
rowly considered. Most importantly, Justice Brennan disagrees
with the Court on the proper philosophy of historical interpreta-
tion. Here he finds Chief Justice Burger again too narrow because
he looked at "specific practices. 221 Justice Brennan, on the other
hand, limits his examination of history to "broad purposes not spe-
cific practices."22 Here we can see Justice Brennan's natural law
jurisprudence in operation. The very points he made in articles are
stated in Marsh as quotations from his concurrence in Abington v.
Schemp 22 3
Because Justice Brennan's natural law perspective leads him to
214. Id. at 800.
215. Id. at 801.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 802.
218. Id. at 811.
219. Id. at 813.
220. Id. at 815.
221. Id. at 816.
222. Id. (citing Abington, 374 U.S. 203, 241 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
223. Id. at 816-17. See Abington v. Schemp 374 U.S. 203 (1963). See also supra
notes 21 and 24.
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focus on the "inherent adaptability of the Constitution,"224 he
finds that "the Court's focus here on a narrow piece of history is,
in a fundamental sense, a betrayal of the lessons of history." 225
While Justice Brennan's jurisprudence is not derived from history
but from the abstract principles of natural law, the historical sur-
vival of exceptional practices which deviate from those principles
does not carry weight with Justice Brennan. The practices are
simply long-standing wrongs which can now be righted by the ap-
plication of the proper principles. Only those principles carry
conviction:
The argument is made occasionally that a strict separation of
religion and state robs the Nation of its spiritual identity. I be-
lieve quite the contrary. It may be that individuals cannot be
"neutral" on the question of religion. But the judgment of the
Establishment Clause is that neutrality by the organs of govern-
ment on questions of religion is both possible and imperative.22
The particularity, and perhaps even more, the relativism of the
nitty-gritty facts of history which fly in the face of Justice Bren-
nan's categories must not be allowed to interfere with the absolute
delineation of governmental and private sectors.
Chief Justice Burger, however, embraces history and prior prac-
tice, which allow him to recognize deviation from the absolute as
well the overlapping scope of such categories as state and religion.
The particular lessons of history which do not sway Justice Bren-
nan permit Chief Justice Burger to tolerate the continued exis-
tence of some long-standing deviation as within the scope of the
Constitution. "History provides the 'facts' upon which the judg-
ment of [constitutionality] is premised. 227
In the second recent opinion, Lynch v. Donnelly,228 the Court's
upholding of a municipal Christmas display, which included a
creche, depended on the historical intersection between the roles
of the state and religion. "This history may help explain why the
Court consistently has declined to take a rigid, absolutist view of
the Establishment Clause. ' 229 According to Burger, the lessons of
history teach that line-drawing, and not absolute rules, must pro-
vide the guidelines to interpreting the establishment clause.
Rather than mechanically invalidating all governmental conduct
or statues that confer benefits or give special recognition to reli-
gion in general or to one faith-as an absolutist approach would
224. Marsh, 463 U.S. 783 at 817.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 821 (citation omitted).
227. Sullivan, supra note 56, at 324.
228. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
229. Id. at 678.
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dictate-the Court has scrutinized challenged-legislation or of-
ficial conduct to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.230
The secular purpose of the municipality in displaying the creche is
in effect analogized to a municipal official attending the religious
funeral of a heroic police officer.2 ' Chief Justice Burger suggests
that since neither the Archbishop of Canterbury nor the Bishop of
Rome threatens the state today, no harm is done.23 2 To Justice
Brennan's concern for harm to the private, religious aspect of the
creche, the Chief Justice answers that mixing sacred and secular
settings sacrilizes the secular rather than profanes the sacred:
"That a prayer invoking Divine guidance in Congress is preceded
and followed by debate and partisan conflict over taxes, budgets,
national defense, and myriad mundane subjects, for example, has
never been thought to demean or taint the sacredness of the
invocation. 233
To Justice Brennan the mix is anathema. From his natural law
perspective, religion and government must remain absolutely sepa-
rate. Thus when he notes with dismay the future inclusion of a
menorah along with a creche as governmental involvement in reli-
gion,2 34 he is suggesting that the Court "blurs the distinction be-
tween" the secular, governmental sphere and the private, religious
sector,235 despite the fact that the Court used one of the acknowl-
edged establishment clause tests.23 6 Again, Justice Brennan stated
that the Court operated under "a fundamental misapprehension of
the proper uses of history in constitutional interpretation. 23 7 In
Marsh, Justice Brennan characterized the misunderstanding as
the use of very specific history to support the constitutionality of
the exceptional practice. In Lynch, Justice Brennan found the
Court seriously at fault for failing to discuss the specific history of
"the public celebration of Christmas or the use of publicly dis-
played nativity scenes. 2 38
Justice Brennan found the puritans' hostility to anglicans' cele-
bration of Christmas in the 17th century dispositive239 but their
230. Id.
231. Id. at 710 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 686.
233. Id. at 685.
234. Id. at 702.
235. Id. at 710.
236. Id. at 713: "Although the Court's relaxed application of the Lemon test to Paw-
tuckett's creche is regrettable, it is at least understandable and properly limited to the
particular facts of this case."
237. Id. at 718.
238. Id. at 713.
239. Id. at 723.
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descendants acceptance of the secular celebration of Christmas in
the nineteenth century irrelevant because general celebration of
Christmas did not come down from the time of the Framers.
"Without that guiding principle and the intellectual discipline it
imposes, the Court is at sea, free to select random elements of
America's varied history solely to suit the views of five members
of this Court. ' 240 That argument is broad enough, however, to in-
validate the recognition of such later developments as imprinting
the words "In God we trust" on the coinage in the wake of the
Civil War and the addition of "one nation under God" in the
pledge of allegiance in the wake of the Korean War. Chief Justice
Burger's use of the history of the establishment clause is designed
to illustrate that the overlap between the spheres of church and
state rather than sharp categories existed even at the time Con-
gress approved the establishment clause, quite apart from the his-
tory of Christmas celebrations in the eighteenth century. To Bren-
nan, that general concentration on the overlap constituted misuse
of history, especially because he found evidence of creches in
eighteenth-century Europe but not in eighteenth-century America.
Justice Brennan candidly restricts the scope of history in constitu-
tional interpretation in favor of solving twentieth-century
problems with twentieth-century categories, in the same way as he
invokes the spirit of Aquinas241 without adopting his substantive
views.
While judicial abstention from a historical argument might
both make a brighter doctrinal line of interpretation and
strengthen the prohibitory function of the establishment clause,
the fact remains that the country is divided about the proper in-
terpretation of the clause. In light of the bitter division over the
Bork nomination, it is clear that the disaffection of the citizenry
who interpret the establishment clause narrowly would rapidly
mount into outrage, if compromise were not reached by allowing
long-standing exceptions to the establishment clause to remain un-
til greater consensus one way or the other is reached. The failure
of the Court to establish a purer doctrinal interpretation of the
establishment clause simply mirrors the failure of the country at
large to reach a consensus, at least since Everson (the "wall of
separation" case) in 1947, if there ever had been a consensus on
church-state relations in this country.242
240. Id. at 725.
241. Justice Brennan's "return to the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas" is quoted
supra in the text accompanying note 17.
242. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). For a study of the use of
history in Everson, see Kelly, supra note 32, at 137-142. See also Kurland, Religion and
the Constitution: "Eternal Hostility Against Every Form of Tyranny over the Mind of
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The Court itself has no coherent position on all establishment
clause cases, and as commentators have pointed out,243 in many
other areas as well. Given the plurality of views on the Court, it is
clear that neither Chief Justice Burger nor Justice Brennan could
weld a new consensus. The most Chief Justice Burger might do
was to preserve the status quo, leaving room for the continued
existence of whatever long-standing exceptions were already in
place. That might contribute to a climate of stability from which
a future consensus might emerge. At no small expense to his own
reputation, Chief Justice Burger appeared willing to forge a hold-
ing pattern on whatever basis he could, even if other Justices' ad-
vocation of a bright line became fragmented in the muddy waters
of the pluralistic Court. While his own position was consistent, as
a recent commentator has shown,244 he did not find enough like-
minded members of the Court to forge his position into a general
consensus.
Justice Brennan challenged Chief Justice Burger not to use his-
tory in either Marsh or Lynch, and thus to enhance the bright
doctrinal line separating religion and state. Justice Brennan al-
ways puts forth his own consistent position, even if he must assert
his views in lone dissent. Chief Justice Burger's concept of leader-
ship on a pluralistic Court could not take the form of adhering to
a pure, bright doctrinal line. Instead, he worked for consensus
through historical exceptions whenever he could. History appeared
a sound enough basis to achieve consensus in those instances. He
declared long before he joined the Court that "[w]henever ex-
isting rules of law cannot meet newly developed conditions affect-
ing important rights of substantial numbers we should not be fear-
ful of a new solution merely because it is new. 12 45 Traditionally,
history meant legal precedents, and not social history or the his-
tory of exceptional practices. Chief Justice Burger's "new solu-
tion" included both: 1) specific historical exception when Justice
Brennan thought the analysis called only for the broad lessons (of
Marsh), and 2) the broad history of the overlap between the roles
of religion and state when Justice Brennan called for the specific
history of the celebration of Christmas (Lynch).
Perhaps the much later understanding of Holmes' 1914 Pipeline
opinion gives Chief Justice Burger some comfort that future com-
mentators will sort out his contribution in the context of our very
Man," U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 705, 714-17 (1987).
243. Alschuler, supra note 193, at 1452; Kurland, supra note 242 at 715.
244. Alschuler, supra note 193, at 1455.
245. Riley v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 246 F.2d 641, 646(D.C. Cir. 1957) (Burger, J., dissenting).
1988]
45
McCauliff: Constitutional Jurisprudence of History and Natural Law: Compleme
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
fragmented Court. Justice Frankfurter reminisced that a com-
merce clause foundation for the Pipeline opinion was too upsetting
to the other Justices, so that Holmes had to forego the commerce
clause "to get out an opinion that is not disturbing for the future,
which sustains this legislation, and gives little further encourage-
ment to the underlying economic impulse behind the legislation
which some of the boys certainly feared. '246 As Justice Frank-
furter noticed, the vital fact for Holmes was the outcome, and not
his own reputation.
When you have to have at least five people to agree on some-
thing, they can't have that comprehensive completeness of can-
dor which is open to a single man ..."
Some people might say, "Well why didn't Holmes tell them to
go to hell!" Imagine him thinking, "Let the statute be declared
unconstitutional. I'll satisfy my sanity to have [the commenta-
tor] now that I am as bright as he is." That was cheap at the
price-to have it declared constitutional.248
It is possible that Chief Justice Burger had some of the same con-
siderations in mind when he chose to explain his decision in
Marsh and Lynch on historical grounds.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORICAL AND NATURAL LAW
APPROACHES TO OPINION WRITING
In constitutional jurisprudence, the judge's use of history pro-
vides flexibility of practice tailored to the customs, expectations
and experience of the people subject to the constitutional laws in
question. History may also provide protection against extreme de-
partures from precedent when circumstances and public opinion
have not changed. It thus balances oppression against chaos and
opts for the middle ground. History, at its simplest, reflects the
recent precedential status quo and popularly held values whether
liberal or conservative. The use of history thus conserves whatever
status quo is established, and provides a continuum from that sta-
tus quo.
The types of questions we ask about the past have expanded so
that recent monographs based on research into these questions
bring new historical knowledge.249 The uses of history in judicial
opinions as well as historical research itself have grown. Several
types of extra-legal history may be used today in judicial opinions.
Not only may basic human values, such as tolerance of ways dif-
246. H. PHILLIPS, supra note 125, at 297.
247. Id. at 298.
248. Id. at 299.
249. Yablon, supra note 185, at 94; Burt supra note 173, at 93.
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ferent from the majority, emerge from the study of history as they
did for the late Judge Wyzanski,250 but history itself may support
such values by disclosing the survival of continued unusual prac-
tices and ways of life.
That toleration appears in an examination of the use of legisla-
tive chaplains and Amish separation and survival. History lent its
support to continuity. The value of lack of disruption emerges
from Chief Justice Burger's opinions; his life-long interest in his-
tory25' has sensitized him to the possibility of violating deeply-held
beliefs and enduring consitutional values, even to tolerate some
overlap between the proper provinces of the state and religion. In
that sense, history is not different from natural law in being the
vessel for moral values and choices. History at its finest illustrates
for its students the operation of morals, as it did for Justice Gray
in the case of Wong Kim Ark and even in shaping Justice Gray's
recognition of America's need for paper money.
Natural law provides a systematic classification as well as pre-
dictability in accordance with the abstract principles chosen. The
values of the system itself are more important than the facts in
any particular case. Natural law theory makes a central claim to
"normative primacy and necessity." '252 It also claims for itself uni-
versal validity "in that it sets justified prescriptive requirements or
precepts for the conduct of all human beings" and "stands as the
most basic criteria of moral rightness." '253 In effect, natural law
theory is self-authenticating and self-legitimating providing its
own validation. Therefore, the use of natural law in opinion writ-
ing is ideal for setting forth a new departure from the precedential
status quo. It simply does not matter if the view set forth is cur-
rently out of fashion because a natural law position claims for it-
self, not historical development, but unchanging validity. Accord-
ing to natural law theory, although society may have in error
departed from that view sanctioned by natural law, the erroneous
departure does not, to the natural law jurist, signify challenge to
the validity of its principles but merely underscores the human
error of that departure. Thus the validity of the principle remains
untouched.
When applied to opinion writing, natural law theory provides an
outstanding rhetorical device to convince its reading audience: the
250. Wyzanski, supra note 6, at 242.
251. Burger, Creating a More Perfect Union, NAT'L PARKS: THE MAGAZINE OF THE
NAT'L PARKS AND CONSERVATION ASS'N 12, 14 (March/April 1987) states that as a boy
Chief Justice Burger, housebound for a year with polio, "immersed himself in early Ameri-
can history and the biographies of our founders."
252. Gewirth, supra note 178, at 95.
253. Id.
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opinion writer assumes the stance of one who, on the high moral
ground of validity, wishes to depart from the erroneous preceden-
tial status quo. In addition, reasoning "issues the moral precepts
of natural law. ' 254 Again, the centrality of natural law's appeal to
reason provides the natural law jurist with another rhetorical de-
vice since reasoning plays a persuasive role in opinion writing gen-
erally. Whether the natural law judge writes for the majority or in
a dissent, natural law proves a powerful method of opinion writing
for the judge who wishes to depart from the precendential status
quo.
The choice of natural law can be distinguished from ordinary
social policy-making and 'neutral principles' 255 on rhetorical
grounds. It is political philosophy, and does take a stand just as
policy making and neutral principles implicitly do by fashioning
the policy to the case or adopting period liberalism. 256 Natural
law, however, explicitly takes its stand and claims for itself a
moral righteousness based on universal principles. Thus in a sense
the rhetorical stance of explaining the decision to the reader rests
on how right this principle of decision-making is. An opinion
structured in this way is designed to give the proposed solution to
the legal issue as strong a support as it is possible to give. In this
sense, too, the judge is putting something of his or her own per-
sonality into the decision-his or her own moral view. It is a pow-
erful tool of persuasion because it invites the reader to become
convinced that the solution the natural law judge poses is cloaked
in absolute righteousness, even if few can see it. The desire for
right and for certainty forms part of this style of opinion writing.
Both methods are neutral. Justice Brennan, perceived as liberal,
and Justice Field, perceived as conservative, used natural law as
the organizing principle of their jurisprudence. Similarly both
Chief Justice Burger, the conservative, and Justice Gray, the lib-
eral, called upon history to explain their decisions. It is clear that
these two approaches capably expressed the jurisprudential views
of each Justice. Both Judges who relied on history sought con-
tinuity, Gray with the immediate liberal past, most characteristi-
cally through strict adherence to legal precedents, and Chief Jus-
tice Burger through longer sweeps of history to preserve harmless
individual practices. Both natural lawyers had a coherent
blueprint for their jurisprudence, Justice Brennan by drawing
sharp, separate lines for the role of the state and for the role of
religion by removing any influence the state might have on reli-
254. Id. at 96.
255. Nelson, supra note 54, at 1262-69.
256. Id. at 1287.
[Vol. 24
48
California Western Law Review, Vol. 24 [2015], No. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol24/iss2/6
1988] CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 335
gious life and by privatizing religion to free daily secular life from
religious influences, and Justice Field by drawing a strict wall of
separation between the public, governmental sphere and the pri-
vate sector.
In an era of change, the sharp theoretical choices of natural
lawyers present the Court and the opinion-reading public with
clear guidelines. Once those guidelines have been usefully under-
stood, however, the times move on to a new synthesis and delinea-
tion so that life itself hardly seems capable of being drawn into
the sharp, clear sectors of jurisprudence. There is thus also need
on the Court for the less sharp lines of history. Justice Field and
Justice Brennan fashioned their jurisprudence as a blueprint to
chart a course for a changing world, Justice Gray and Chief Jus-
tice Burger to provide continuity between the worlds of yesterday
and tomorrow.
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